National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

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166 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s The Development of the UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle During the Yom Kippur War, Syrian missile batteries in Lebanon caused heavy damages to Israeli fighter jets. As a result, Israel developed the first modern UAV - unmanned aerial vehicle. The images provided by these UAV helped Israel to completely neutralize and destroy the Syrian Air defenses at the beginning of the 1982 Lebanon war resulting in no damage to the IAF. The IAF used again most of the UAV systems in the second Lebanon war (2006) and in the Gaza war (2008). The UAV developed specially for surveillance purposes with the ability to carry weapons. Israel is a leader in this field and has succeeded in building short term aircraft and also long term UAV capable of staying airborne for 24 hours or more. The Strategic Arm of the State of Israel The Israeli air force is seen by the leaders of Israel as the strategic defense arm of the State. A large part of the defense budget is invested in the IAF, which enabled it to purchase and operate the most advanced aircrafts in the world. In it serve air crews and ground crews trained to the highest possible degree. Over the years the IAF has participated in numerous operations (many of them are still secret), which represent a colossal contribution to the security of Israel. Many of the operations are taught in military academies world-wide and the IAF is highly rated among the most advanced air forces in the world. The Israel air force is in a constant state of readiness 24 hours a day to defend the skies and the space of the country and its population, being able to act at very short notice to any mission that may be demanded of it. UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – RQ-2 developed in the Israeli Aircraft Industry.
daV i d iV r y * The Air Arm during the Lebanon War 1982 Background Israele As a preface to direct reference to the use of air power in 1982, one should understand several transformations that the Israel Air Force experienced in the field of air warfare, organization and weapons, in order to better analyze the war and its results. The destruction of air forces on the ground within a few hours during the Six Day War (1967), and the air combat achievements, were both an unprecedented achievement, which also has mixed results because it led to great expectations from the Israel Air Force. On the other hand, the defeated air forces learned many lessons and implemented them, so it was impossible to repeat the results. Shielded shelters were built for aircraft that exceeded their number, additional runways were built and many emergency runways were prepared. All this was part of passive defense. The anti-a/c defense got a huge leverage, guns but mainly missile. The surfaceto-air missile (SAM) was a leap forward when the Soviet doctrine of operating a strenuous independent arm, the divisions of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 batteries were the massive foundation of the doctrine, and thousands of SA-7 missiles were available in almost any unit or military facility. During the War of Attrition (1968-1970), this concept was leveraged and the Israel Air Force found itself in August 1970 with a cease fire treaty, when the Egyptian army had advanced its surface-to-air missiles right up to the canal, contrary to the agreement, but Israel had to restrain itself because it did not have a decisive answer to surface-to-air missiles. As part of the means that the IAF had, it developed attack methods and war doctrine, including the use of air power in the presence of surfaceto-air missiles. EW methods were also acquired from the U.S., means that were developed during the Vietnam War. We arrived at the Yom Kippur War in 1973, after improving the attack tactics and EW capability; however, we did not succeed in pushing forward the development of weapons to destroy surface-to-air missiles, thus losing the air freedom of action we were used to, and which the IDF ground forces were used to. In the operation plans prior to the Yom Kippur War, the IAF demanded 48 hours to launch air power against surface-to-air missiles sites and air bases, thus assuring air superiority to continue fighting. The IDF staff level was sympathetic to this; however reality in the 1973 war did not enable such luxury. The IAF was required * M.Gen., former Chief of the IDF Air Force.
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National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

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