National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

294 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
Pärnu, Riga, Liepaja and others, as well as against air fields used by the Russians.
Important bridges, like the one in Kaunas, Lithuania over the river Njemen and railroad
junctions as Tapa in northern Estonia were also regarded as important targets
for the Swedish bombers. The main aim was to prevent the invasion, or at least stop
the second echelon of the invading force before it left the eastern coast of the Baltic
Sea. In case of war with Germany the main potential targets were the northern
harbour at Rostock, Sassnitz, Swinemünde and, maybe, also the large naval base at
Kiel. However, Kiel was so heavily defended that even in theory an attack against
that naval base must be regarded as extremely risky and very likely to fail.
An obvious risk in case of war was also that the enemy could answer on Swedish
attacks against his bases with attacks on the bases of the Swedish bombers. To prevent
that the doctrine in use in Sweden in the mid 1930´s argued for several different
bases to be prepared. This doctrine was teached at the War College by the Air Force
officer Axel Ljungdahl and presented in a paper by Björn Bjuggren. The tactics used
was to spread out the planes on bases far from the coastline or land borders, and to
assemble them in an advanced base just before the beginning of an operation. After
an attack on enemy bases of ships, the planes would return to the more remote and
better protected bases.
Much of the Swedish debate concerned the limited capabilities of the fighter force
as well as the anti aircraft-artillery. The Swedish fighters of the time could only operate
over a smallarea and for a very limited period of time. This ment that the planes
had to be based very close to the target that they were supposed to protect, and also
relieved after a short while of time in the air. But the most important problem was
the need for warnings to the fighterbases in god time before the enemy bomber arrived
to the target. The warningsystems at the time didn´t fulfil that need. In the case
of the capitol, Stockholm, there was a strong doubt of wether any warning would
arrive in time, so that the fighters could start and create their formations in the sky.
And even if son, how to direct the fighters against the bomber? There were no such
systems in operation. The only hope was the visual observations by the fighter pilots
themselves. This is why the discussion about to defend Sweden´s cities tended
to corcle about how to attack the enemy bases themselves. This was regarded the
only efficient way to defence the mother country, regardless of the geographical and
tactical problems with such a doctrine. The weak capabilities of the fighters against
enemy bombers were stressed in a large manoeuvre in Skåne in southern Sweden in
1935. The same was the situation of the antiaircraft artillery. All this were regarded
as supporting those who argued for a large bomber fleet, as an indirect defence for
our cities and industries. The question then was how large the proportion of bombers
there should be among the aircraft.
The defence resolution of 1936 decided there should be four bomber wings, one
fighter wing and two reconnaissance wings, in total seven wings ore three more than
at the creation of a unified Air Force in 1926. The fighter wing, F 8, was deployed
close to Stockholm.