National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

278 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
consolidated this position with barbed wire, cleared fields of fire, created minefields,
constructed shelters and concentrated artillery. General Ridgway, UN Commanderin-Chief
(UNCINC), authorized local advances to gain more favourable ground for
defence and Van Fleet launched Operation Piledriver on 1 June 1951, which was
to bring the US I and IX Corps to the Wyoming line by 15 June 1951. During this
advance they encountered heavy enemy resistance organised in depth, as they approached
the base of the ”Iron Triangle”. 28
The Air Situation
The air war during this period was characterized by two features: an intensified
interdiction by the Far East Air Force (FEAF) into which SAAF, ROKAF and
RAAF elements were incorporated, and the implementation of a revised air war plan
by the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) in mid-June. The FEAF interdiction
campaign was named Operation Strangle and its objective was to isolate the MLR
from its sources of supply in North Korea and Manchuria. A strip of territory stretching
east-west across Korea, between 38° 15’N and 39° 15’N, was divided into three
interdiction zones, a zone being allocated each to the 5th Air Force, the Navy and the
1st Marine Air Wing. The enemy road and rail systems were placed under 24-hour
attack (see Map 1). 29
The revised air war plan of the CCAF was probably resulted from a conference
between CCAF officers and their Soviet advisers held in Mukden in May 1951. The
failure of the ground offensive was attributed to the CCAF’s failure to gain air superiority
over Korea and in an attempt to rectify the situation it was decided that new
‘International Communist Volunteer Air Force’ personnel would assist the CCAF;
efforts to repair the North Korean airfields would be redoubled with the aid of cover
provided by MIG-15’s; nuisance raids would be conducted against the South as soon
as the North Korean airfields could take light aircraft; while Ilyushin ground attack
aircraft (with crews trained by Russian advisers) would support the CCAF ground
forces in a new offensive. 30
The Combat Role of 2 Squadron
In common with other fighter-bomber squadrons of the 5 th Air Force, 2 Sqn SAAF
was very involved in these events and both air and ground crews had to work very
hard to maintain operations. Most of the FEAF fighter-bomber effort centred on
interdiction missions, while the fighter-bombers were also utilised for close support,
rescue and escort missions, or were diverted while en route to interdiction targets.
28 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
29 D. Rees, Korea: The Limited War, MacMillan, London, 1964, p. 376.
30 R.F. Futrell, L.S. Mosley & A.F. Simpson, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, Duell,
Sloan and Pierce, New York, 1961, pp. 278-279.