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National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

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do u H e t o r n o t do u H e t. sw e d i sH air po w e r do C t r i n e in t H e 1930´s a n d 1940´s 299<br />

The history of the Swedish Air Force between the years 1934 and 1945 shows how<br />

fast a military doctrine, in this case an Air doctrine, can change, due to technological<br />

and practical development as well as other factors, national and international.<br />

The fast shift in Sweden´s Air doctrine especially the years 1940-42 resulted in<br />

effects <strong>for</strong> several decades to come, first regarding the concentration of bombers as<br />

a tool against the invasion fleet and not the enemy bases on land, later in the same<br />

basic tasks <strong>for</strong> the new attack planes of the Air Force. The stability in this shift is<br />

underlined if we study the debate during the 1950´s whether Sweden´s armed <strong>for</strong>ces<br />

should get nuclear capability. In 1954 the CIC of the armed <strong>for</strong>ces, Nils Swedlund,<br />

argued that Sweden should have nuclear arms <strong>for</strong> tactical use, either against an invading<br />

fleet approaching across the Baltic Sea, or against large troop concentration<br />

that already had landed on the beaches. It´s not explicitly clear whether the armed<br />

<strong>for</strong>ces were prepared to launch nuclear attacks on Sweden´s own territory, or against<br />

important enemy harbour and railroad junctions. But what is clear is that the Swedish<br />

armed <strong>for</strong>ces totally rejected any proposal <strong>for</strong> Swedish nuclear arms to be used<br />

<strong>for</strong> strategical purposes. However a few voices in the debate argued <strong>for</strong> a strategical<br />

devise, the so called “Leningrad-bomb”, in order to deter the Soviet Union to use<br />

nuclear arms against Swedish cities. But these voices had no anchorage within the<br />

armed <strong>for</strong>ces. 16<br />

However, if the shift in Sweden´s Air doctrine had not been taken place in 1940-<br />

42, the debate in the 1950´s could have been a more explicit one about a Douhetinfluenced<br />

doctrine in combination with nuclear arms. That would have been a totally<br />

different history.<br />

16 Jan Thörnqvist, Den öppna och den slutna militära debatten om taktisk och operativ anpassning av<br />

försvaret mot kärnvapen, 1954 till 1965 (In English: The open and secret military debate about the<br />

operational adjustment of the armed <strong>for</strong>ces towards nuclear arms, 1954 to 1965), i Kent Zetterberg,<br />

ed., Svenska kärnvapen? En antologi uppsatser kring frågan om svenska taktiska kärnvapen under<br />

kalla kriget (In English: Swedish nuclear arms? An anthology of papers concerning the question<br />

about Swedish tactical nuclear arms during the cold war), Stockholm 2010 pp. 51-83.

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