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238 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s by aerial reconnaissance, or to detect suspicious signs of imminent attack, as it was possible to stop its advance with intimidating aerial fire. In the following stage the enemy hides in the forest and ambushes the military columns, by flogging actions against the barracks, being much more difficult to detect them; the enemy forces in presence have now a military character, with political and technical preparation, and begin using more sophisticated armament - instead of machetes and canhangulos, they start having automatic weapons, mines and shells, decreasing the attacks on the population and attacking our forces, according to the technique of hit and run, filtering through the jungle, a difficult place to penetrate by conventional military forces. However, they have other type of difficulties: the adherence of the population, estranged from ideological or political motivation, which in its majority wants peace above all, and the need of getting supplies across the border by creating corridors of infiltration with a minimum of fixed points or routes considered indispensable but detectable by air. As mentioned, the air operations were very much oriented for visual reconnaissance, for armed reconnaissance, to attack small and very well located guerrilla targets, for close air support to ground forces, in addition to logistical support actions for the benefit of the military forces. The missions of assault with helicopters and special forces, with fire support given by the T - 6, the PV2, the F - 84, and the helicopter gunship (side fire power with 20 m/m cannon shot) were very relevant in the context of operational situation. Also the air action of tracking enemy trails, executed with helicopters and paratroopers, which consisted of discovering and tracking the infiltrators from the North, concluded by detection, arrest or attack on guerrilla groups in supplying operations was a very significant example of use of air power. In Angola there was only one main operating air base, BA No 9, throughout all the period of war until 1975 (in Portuguese classification military airfields could be main operating airbase – BA, aerodrome bases – AB, tactical airfields – AM, and alternate or temporary airfields – AR, depending on the infrastructure, the volume of resources and the organiza tion). There were two aerodrome bases, one in Negage, AB 3, built in 1961 as we have already seen and the other in Henri que de Carvalho, AB 4, implemented afterwards. It was yet legally established a third one aerodrome base, the AB10 in Serpa Pinto, but was never activated. In addition to these major infrastructures there were still tactical airfields (AM) and alternate airfields. Dependent on BA 9 there was the AM95 in Cabinda; AM 31 in Maquela do Zombo, AM 32 in Toto, AM 33 in Malange depended on the AB 3; dependent on AB 4 were AM 41 in Portugalia, AM 42 in Camaxilo, AM 43 in Cazombo and AM 44 in Luso. The alternate airfields were the N’Riquinha, Cuito Canavale and Gago Coutinho. From the tumultuous times of the year 1961, military operations in Angola entered a phase of routine in the Northern Intervention Zone, in that it was characterized by typical guerrilla warfare, with control of territory by the Portuguese forces. However other movements appeared, the MPLA and UNITA, and the ini tial movement of UPA developed into FNLA. For political reasons, these forces moved
do C t r i n e, Ca pa C i t i e s, te C H n o l o g y a n d o p e r at i o n a l en v i r o n m e n t o n t H e em p l o y m e n t o f t H e air po w e r ; t H e Ca s e o f guerrilla wa r fa r e 239 eastward, nearly five years after the initial operations in the North, forcing the creation by the Portuguese authorities of the Eastern Intervention Zone (ZIL) covering the districts of Lunda and Moxico. After 1966 the Portuguese forces began to confront the three movements in this ZIL, which required a redirection of effort. AB 4 was reinforced with six PV2, two of which were deployed permanently in Luso, and in 1968 it already had a Beechcraft 45 plane, 11 T-6G and 11 DO27 flying about 300 hours per month in total. The total air resources in Angola were roughly maintained, being some of them redirected to the East. The fleet of helicopters Allouette III, which arrived in 1963, reached in 1972 its maximum number of 29 units which conducted about 4,500 flight hours per year, always attributed to BA 9 organically, but with detachments on several bases in the theatre of operations in transport actions of assault, fire support and medical evacuation. In 1970, 5 SA-330 helicopters, PUMA, came to the theatre of operations, integrated in Squadron 94 but operating in the East; the year after the fleet is enhanced with another helicopter of this type. Until the end of 1973 they conducted on average about 1,200 flight hours per year. These helicopters were deployed in Mozambique, at AB 7, in a total of three in 1973 and five in 1974. This means a transfer of war effort along the time. Between 1963 and 1966 a P2V5 airplane was deployed to BA 9 for air patrol, and carried out 1064 flight hours in 508 missions in the first year, 1083 flight hours in 162 missions the following year, and 200 flight hours and 39 missions in the last year of deployment (1966). A major effort on the East front, with aircrafts diverting from other units, the introduction of the fleet of B26, in numbers of four aircraft in October 1972 and the inactivation of the F-84 the following November were the biggest differences from the start up of the theatre of operations. The tactical airfield of Luso becomes the centre of air operations with PV2, T-6, DO27 and ALL III, stationed there or based on AB 4. The operations assumed a character of routine and the Portuguese armed forces tried to disconnect the enemy organization, which suffered many difficulties of various kinds on the ground - the first of which was the lack of unity among the three movements. The battle for development continued throughout the province, now that the necessary security measures were reached. The war in Guinea The war in Guinea had very different characteristics from the war in Angola, namely in the way it was initiated, in the organization of the guerrilla and in the geographical characteristics of the territory. The evidence of the existence of a rebel movement was also given by a relatively spectacular fact that was the vandalizing of the touristic infrastructure on the beach of Ponta Varela, up North, which led to the
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CIHM Commissione internazionale di
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Joseph Abboudi - Israele The milita
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National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

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