National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

tH e pl a C e o f do u H e t: a reassessment 117
the mid/late 20s and early/mid 30s - a preoccupation which began with the restoration
of amicable relations with France and with the rebirth of the Italian Airforce
after the rise to power of Mussolini (and which ended with the coming of Hitler and
the rebirth of the German Airforce). The fact that the Italian Airforce had become
by the late 20s one of the largest, most modern, best equipped, and most powerful
airforces in the world made such interest entirely natural.
In his biography of Balbo, Claudio Segré rightly reminded us of the high regard
in which Italian aviation was held throughout the world in the period from the mid
20s to the mid 30s - due to the personal magnetism of the dashing Balbo; the audacity
of his long-distance mass formation flights; the record-breaking successes
of Italian pilots and aeroplanes (not least the Italian victories in the Schneider Trophy
contests); and the great technical achievements of Italy’s aircraft designers and
manufacturers - most notably Caproni heavy bombers, Savoia-Marchetti flying boats
and Macchi racers.(At the time of his early death, Segre was working on a full-scale
biography of Douhet, which we still lack. I had shared my preliminary findings with
him and he was intending to follow up my research).
One should also not forget the considerable contemporary interest in, and respect
for, Fascism on the part of many soldiers and politicians outside Italy.
It is perfectly fair to ask exactly why should the RAF be not only interested in
but also influenced by Italian aviation in these years? And why Italian rather than
French or US aviation? Hoare provides much of the answer - the “Regia Aeronautica”
was throughout this period the only other independent airforce in the world, the
only other airforce that was not just in both thought and practice an auxiliary of the
army and navy; and Italy was one of the very few countries where really dramatic
advances were being made in the field of aviation - technically, administratively and
doctrinally. One should remember that serious debates about strategic airpower did
not occur in France or in the US till the early 30s - and in both cases, Douhet’s ideas
figured prominently.
Besides the role of the British Air Attaches in Rome, there is of course to be considered
the role of the Italian Air Attaches in London. There is no reason to believe
that the latter would have been in any way shy about aeronautical developments in
the “new” Italy, or about Douhet, Italy’s honoured son - on the contrary. Especially,
as in 1926-7 the Italian Air Attaché in London was General Alessandro Guidoni.
Guidoni, a world renowned aerial torpedo expert, spoke fluent English and had been
friendly with British and US airmen ever since he had been the Italian technical
delegate to the Inter-Allied Aviation Committee during the war. His advice had been
sought by the US aviation mission under Crowell which visited Europe in 1919. He
had been awarded the OBE by Britain for his war services, was greatly admired by
Trenchard, and was elected an Hon. Fellow of the RAeS in 1927. A friend of both
Caproni and Douhet, he had also befriended Mitchell and Charlton when he had
served as Italian Air Attaché in Washington during the early 20s; he advised Mitchell
on technical matters at the time of his famous bombing tests on warships.