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National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

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In c o n c l u s I v e e x p e r I m e n t – brItIsh AIr po w e r A n d t h e su e z crIsIs, 1956. th e Al l I e d AIr cA m pA I g n reAssessed 75<br />

failed to destroy it. Further missions by ground attack planes were not carried out<br />

owing to the possibility of causing civilian casualties and the leaflet missions were<br />

cancelled as well. 76<br />

Due to the abandonment of the initial timetable, there was no concentrated air<br />

ef<strong>for</strong>t against the Egyptian Army installations. They were subjected to bombing<br />

from 2 November. Large targets, such as Huckstep Camp and Almaza Barracks,<br />

were subjected to aerial attacks. In addition, the air campaign included an extensive<br />

number of battlefield interdiction sorties aimed at preventing rein<strong>for</strong>cements from<br />

reaching Port Said from the morning of 3 November. 77<br />

On 4 November, the air ef<strong>for</strong>t was redirected because the landing sequence had<br />

been altered. According to the Air Task Force’s overall plan, most of the attack sorties<br />

were directed against the defences of Port Said. 78 Most of the sorties near Port Said<br />

were flown by naval aircraft that strafed the coastal and anti-aircraft positions and<br />

other static defences throughout the day. The land-based ground attack planes were<br />

still used <strong>for</strong> interdiction. 79 The bomber <strong>for</strong>ce, the role of which diminished after the<br />

Egyptian Air Force was destroyed, made to raids against Huckstep Barracks and as<br />

a diversion against coastal defences near Alexandria. 80<br />

PERIOD PROPORTION OF TOTAL EFFORT<br />

Day 1<br />

Day 2<br />

Day 3<br />

Day 4<br />

Day 5<br />

Day 6<br />

Airfields Barracks Armed<br />

Reconnaissance<br />

96%<br />

68%<br />

34%<br />

22%<br />

19%<br />

11%<br />

-<br />

25%<br />

16%<br />

8%<br />

15%<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

33%<br />

8%<br />

15%<br />

25%<br />

Table 3: Allocation of air ef<strong>for</strong>t against different target categories<br />

Defences Others<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

39%<br />

47%<br />

60%<br />

4%<br />

7%<br />

17%<br />

22%<br />

10%<br />

4%<br />

76<br />

See Brian Cull with David Nicolle and Shlomo Aloni, Wings Over Suez, pp. 237-239. For a description<br />

of the raid from the time, see NA AIR 20/9967, Bomber Wing Cyprus, “Report on Operation<br />

Musketeer, annex D”, 30 December 1956.<br />

77<br />

NA AIR 14/4030, Admiralty, Department of Operational Research, August 1957, Report No.34:<br />

“Carrier Operations in Support of Operation Musketeer” and Brian Cull with David Nicolle and<br />

Shlomo Aloni, Wings Over Suez, pp. 248-262.<br />

78<br />

NA AIR 20/10206, Air Task Force Headquarters, 3 November 1956, “Operation Telescope, Overall<br />

Air Plan”.<br />

79<br />

ADM 116/6104, Office of the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers, 14 December 1956, “Operation Musketeer<br />

– Reports of Proceedings – Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers”, pp. 23-24.<br />

80<br />

NA AIR 14/4441, Bomber Command, Operational Research Branch, Report number 355: “Bombing<br />

and Ground Attack Operations during Operation Musketeer”.

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