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286 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s Charlies’ by 5th Air Force personnel. In the early hours of 14 June two PO-2’s headed southwards, one bombed a runway repair crew at Suwon Airbase (K-13) while the other an Eighth Army vehicle park near Inchon. 48 This was hardly effective close air support, but it was a beginning. K-16 airfield, situated on an island in the Han River south of Seoul, was vulnerable to attack and during the night of 15-16 June K-16 was bombed and strafed, but o damage or casualties was reported. 49 During the next few days CCAF increased its air activity as it attempted to implement the revised air war plan of 10 May 1951. On 17 June, Sabres from 4 Wing encountered 25 MIG-15’s, whose pilots were more aggressive than before and large numbers of MIG-15’s again challenged the Sabres on 18 and 19 June. On 20 June a flight of Mustangs from 18 Fighter Bomber Wing were sweeping a road south of Sinuiju when they encountered eight IL-10’s (Ilyushin ground attack aircraft) en route to render close support to the CCF ground forces on the island of Sinmi-do. Both sides called for reinforcements and a dogfight ensued involving in addition to the original Mustangs and IL-10’s, Yak-9’s, MIG-15’s and Sabres. The 5th Air Force lost one Mustang in exchange for one Yak-9 and two IL- 10’s destroyed as well as damage to three IL-10’s and four MIG-15’s. 50 The FEAF commanders decided to meet the mounting air threat with an intensive airfield neutralization programme. From 17 June onwards B-26’s attacked the North Korean airfields at night, while B-29’s and the fighter-bombers attacked during the day. 51 A decisive stage of the war was reached, both on the ground and in the air. 2 Sqn also became involved in the airfield raids. On 18 and 19 June SAAF aircraft bombed airstrips at Ongjin and Haeju with 500lb bombs and counted nine direct hits afterwards. 52 On 23 June Capt J. Swanepoel led Lts D. Green, S. de la Harpe and T. Sivertsen on an attack against the revetments at Sariwon airfield, which was protected by 37 automatic weapons and numerous 20mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns. Swanepoel led his flight in at 6-15 metres above the ground and succeeded in covering the target with napalm. Due to the intense and accurate incoming fire they did not wait around to survey the damage. The same day separate flights of four aircraft each from 2 Sqn attacked the airfields at Anak, Sinmak and Ongjin and on 24 June flights of four aircraft from 2 Sqn attacked the airfields at Sariwon, Anak, Sinmak and Haeju using V.T. fused rockets for flak suppression and 500lb bombs to pothole the runways. 53 As the ground offensive came to an end, the air offensive moved into 48 Futrell, et al., United States Air Force in Korea, p. 280. 49 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 22 May 1951 and 16 June 1951. 50 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 20 June 1951; and Futrell, et al., United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 280-281. 51 Futrell, et al., United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 281-282. 52 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 18 June 1951; and Box 16, Debriefing Forms SAAF220, 18 and 19 June 1951. 53 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 23 and 24 June 1951; and Box 16, Debriefing Forms SAAF220, 23 and 24 June 1951.
tH e so u t H af r i C a n air fo r C e: Hi s t o r i C a l notes a n d in v o lv e m e n t in t H e ko r e a n wa r 287 top gear and with the commencement of the FEAF airfield neutralization programme North Korea and her allies began to make peace overtures (see Map 1). Cost in Men and Material The UN pilots face quite a challenge as their opponents were determined to protect supply routes, supply dumps and airfields from air attack. Besides excellent camouflage techniques, they also employed a heavy anti-aircraft screen and in May 1951 FEAF intelligence officers plotted the positions of 252 anti-aircraft guns and 673 automatic weapons. The anti-aircraft gun positions were fixed, but a major danger along the main supply routes was posed by truck-towed 37mm Soviet M-1939 automatic weapons (effective against targets up to 1 400m). 54 Test flights that UN forces did against own forces anti-aircraft batteries revealed the extreme vulnerability of the wingman in the two aircraft low-level reconnaissance while searching for targets. After these tests 18 Fighter-Bomber Wing (including 2 Sqn) changed their armed reconnaissance tactics in an effort to avoid further losses. Now, only the flight leader flew at 100m looking for targets of opportunity, while the remaining three aircraft covered him against flak from 1200m. 55 Between 22 April and 24 June 1951, 2 Sqn lost five aircraft as a direct result of enemy ground fire and three to accidents, while eight were damaged in action. Pilot casualties amounted to three killed (two in accidents) and four wounded. One pilot listed as missing in action (MIA) was later found to be a prisoner of war. The Mustang’s liquid cooled engine also made it particularly vulnerable to ground fire. This factor combined with the fact that Chinese regiments had an air defence company armed with Soviet 12,7mm machine guns (very effective against low-flying aircraft) increased the operational hazard. On 29 April Capt Kotze’s aircraft was hit in the engine by automatic fire while attacking enemy troops dug in along a ridge north of Seoul. His leader, Lt I. Gow, strafed and silenced the gun position, receiving a bullet through the wing in the process. 56 On 30 April Lt P. Celliers led four aircraft on a bombing mission against a railway tunnel on the line between Sinmak and Kumchon. Taking off from K-10 at 08h40 they bombed the tunnel with 500lb G.P. bombs and then split up into two elements to search for secondary targets. At 10h15 Celliers’ aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire about 20km to the east of the original target. He baled out of the burning aircraft almost immediately. His wingman, Lt G.G. Paterson, alerted rescue and also re-assembled the original flight, leading it and another 2 Sqn flight to Celliers until he was rescued by helicopter. Celliers finally 54 Futrell, et al., United States Air Force in Korea, p. 307. 55 Ibid., p. 306; and Republic of Korea, History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, Vol. 1, p. 421. 56 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 14, Debriefing Forms SAAF220, 29 April 1951.
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