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Carmen Bunzl - Universidad Pontificia Comillas

Carmen Bunzl - Universidad Pontificia Comillas

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Chapter 5. Conclusions 232<br />

Even though the future climate change regime will probably be based on targets<br />

and timetables some have suggested that incentives are driving a bottom-up<br />

international climate policy and the effort to develop a comprehensive, elegant,<br />

top-down architecture is not viable. They propose to rely on individual<br />

countries to coordinate policies or to implement unilateral policies. These<br />

bottom-up architectures would eventually evolve into a more cohesive<br />

international architecture, as countries gain more experience with their<br />

domestic efforts and understanding of other countries’ activities. This may be<br />

viable in the mean time until the Copenhagen deal in 2009 is reached, but from then<br />

on a comprehensive and global architecture has to be agreed on. The climate change<br />

issue demands concrete internationally agreed targets – even though some<br />

countries are currently opposed to these. Although policies such as those that<br />

ensure coordinated international research and development programs or<br />

technology standards will obviously contribute to the global effort, they may<br />

not be sufficient to address the urgent climate change problem; certainly not if<br />

only based on pledges.<br />

Another decision to be made is whether national targets should be based on<br />

negotiating strengths or formulas. Some suggest that it is easier to agree on the<br />

reduction target for the world as a whole or a block of countries than for<br />

individual countries. In addition, reduction targets and special provisions for<br />

individual countries are dependent upon their bargaining and negotiation<br />

strengths. Commitments could be based upon some formulas combining, among others,<br />

indicators of responsibility – perhaps based on cumulated greenhouse emissions –<br />

and capability – based on per-capita income. Combining the two would provide<br />

a way to operationalize the concept of common but differentiated<br />

responsibilities and capabilities. The formula could serve as a stepping off point<br />

for negotiations to achieve the actual reduction targets, taking into account<br />

differences in national circumstances.<br />

Only a compromise approach can be equally appealing to all countries. As<br />

discussed in Chapter 2, each approach is more attractive for some and less<br />

Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería ICAI <strong>Carmen</strong> <strong>Bunzl</strong> Boulet Junio 2008

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