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Carmen Bunzl - Universidad Pontificia Comillas

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Chapter 2. Options for future climate change architectures 47<br />

advanced in their development and where the emissions are well correlated<br />

with GDP. In some developing countries the direct relationship is not always<br />

apparent, thus increasing uncertainty. For example, Argentina offered a<br />

voluntary target indexed to GDP (it related emissions to the square root of<br />

GDP) in 1999, where a 1% increase in GDP would allow a 0.5% increase in<br />

emissions; this was due to the fact that agriculture contributes significantly to<br />

emissions, but less significantly to the national GDP.<br />

When the USA rejected its Kyoto target in 2001, it suggested an intensity<br />

target as alternative, aiming to reduce its intensity by 18% in 10 years – a 3%<br />

annual increase of the GDP would mean a 10% increase in absolute emissions<br />

over the 10 years. However, it is unlikely that they would accept an intensity<br />

target as stringent as their Kyoto target.<br />

The EU, Japan and other developed countries may accept this type of<br />

commitment if set at a sufficiently stringent level.<br />

Intensity targets can be environmentally effective if set at sufficient stringent<br />

levels, although the ultimate outcome remains uncertain due to the link of the<br />

unknown growth of the GDP. When combined with emission trading, their<br />

economic efficiency is high, but less than for absolute targets, as the final level<br />

of emission allowances is not known. Equity concerns are accommodated by<br />

the selection of the countries and the stringency of their commitments. As with<br />

absolute targets, the technical feasibility depends on the institutional<br />

circumstances in the country; anyhow, a great amount of data is needed to<br />

assure the compliance of the target. Setting intensity targets involves additional<br />

knowledge about the relation between emissions and GDP.<br />

2.1.1.3 No-lose targets<br />

Emission rights can be sold is the target is overachieved, but none have to be<br />

bought if it is not reached (see Philibert, 2000). This way, this type of targets can<br />

only have advantages but no disadvantages for the country.<br />

Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería ICAI <strong>Carmen</strong> <strong>Bunzl</strong> Boulet Junio 2008

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