14.09.2014 Views

Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RWISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASIN OZETi<br />

4 Turkish Probe February 24, 1994<br />

Special Report<br />

Turkey and the Middle East:<br />

Hostages to the PKK?<br />

Ism<strong>et</strong> G. Ims<strong>et</strong><br />

Part 3: Me<strong>et</strong>ing the Iraqi Kurds<br />

he PKK's relations with the Iraqi Kurdish<br />

T movement is quite old, starting all the way. in<br />

southeastern Turkey in the 1970s but gaIning<br />

momentum only after the organization's lea<strong>de</strong>r<br />

Abdullah Öcalan moved out to Syria and Lebanon.<br />

When the organization launched its first activities<br />

in the Turkish Southeast as early as 1978, it also<br />

entered a comp<strong>et</strong>ition with local Kurdish movements<br />

which had connections with those in neighboring<br />

Iraq. Many families had relatives on both si<strong>de</strong>s of<br />

the bor<strong>de</strong>r and this was a convenient way of expanding<br />

ties. By the time the PKK entered the scene<br />

of Kurdish activity, Iraqi Kurdish groups already had<br />

their own extensions in these territories and this resulted<br />

-- at times -- in armed conflict with the "Apoeus"<br />

or followers of Abdullah. In the later years, as<br />

Öcalan directly contacted the Iraqi Kurds, relations<br />

<strong>de</strong>veloped. First there was contact with Patriotic Union<br />

of Kurdistan (PUK) lea<strong>de</strong>r Jalal Talabani. Then a<br />

protocol was signed with Masoud Barzani's Kurdistan<br />

Democrat Party (KDP). Camps were opened in<br />

Iraqi territory and, as the years went by, the PKK<br />

even established contact with Baghdad. Looking<br />

back at relations with Iraqi Kurds, what has to be<br />

emphasized is that although Talabani has always<br />

been more sympath<strong>et</strong>ic and closer to the PKK, compared<br />

to Barzani he was perhaps the least affecte~<br />

directly by the conflict in Turkey. At least, up until<br />

1994 when Turkish j<strong>et</strong>s struck a major camp in Talabani's<br />

territory.<br />

Areas used in northern Iraq by the PKK to shelter,<br />

train and carry out cross-bor<strong>de</strong>r assaults into Turkey<br />

have -- since the ruthless 1975 campaign of Iraqi<br />

troops in that territory -- been un<strong>de</strong>r the control to a<br />

large extent of the KDP of Mullah Mustafa Barzani<br />

and after 1979, his son Masoud, who inherited the<br />

movement.<br />

Thus, whenever Turkish forces attacked this territory<br />

or whenever the PKK had armed conflicts<br />

with the local Kurds. the KDP was directly effected<br />

whereas the PUK or Talabani's movement,<br />

which has control more to the south and southeast<br />

of the region, has always been a safe distance<br />

away. .<br />

The camps which the PKK occupied in northern<br />

Iraq have almost always been villages evacuated by<br />

Barzani's people and the villages hit by Turkish warplanes<br />

have always been those of the KDP, including<br />

Barzan, the hom<strong>et</strong>own of Barzani.<br />

The beginning of relations<br />

In 1983, when the PKK was still an unprofessional<br />

organization without local support and <strong>de</strong>pending<br />

much on the amount of foreign support it could g<strong>et</strong>,<br />

it was Turkey -- not any other regional country --<br />

which literally thrust this organization into the lap of<br />

Iraqi Kurds and which triggered a period in which<br />

the PKK would grow, professionalize in guerrilla<br />

warfare and use the territory of a neighboring country<br />

extensively for attacks which have claimed 5,000<br />

lives in nine years. If a summary of the PKK's links<br />

with the Iraqi Kurdish movement needs to be given,<br />

it could be seen that this relationship began on the<br />

formal level only in July 1983 with PKK lea<strong>de</strong>r Abdullah<br />

Öcalan and KDP leacler Masoud Barzani<br />

signing what was then called a protocol on "the solidarity<br />

principles of the KDP and PKK," which<br />

marked the beginning of an alliance. This protocol,<br />

bearing the signatures of Abdullah Öcalan and Masoud<br />

Barzani, was actually a document of un<strong>de</strong>rstanding<br />

that the two organizations would cooperate<br />

in their struggle against the Turkish and Iraqi regimes.<br />

The alliance would, with its ups and downs, last<br />

four and a half years without any serious problems,<br />

until1987, when the KDP pOlitburopublished its first<br />

warning, reprimanding the PKK for not abiding by<br />

the principles of the protocol. However, relations b<strong>et</strong>ween<br />

the PKK and KDP continued and only en<strong>de</strong>d<br />

after two years when the KDP openly bran<strong>de</strong>d the<br />

former as an organization acting against Kurdish interests<br />

and heavily criticized it for killing Kurdish<br />

people, including civilians. In this period, though, the<br />

PKK became stronger and, from an organization <strong>de</strong>pending<br />

on foreign support, it turned into an organization<br />

<strong>de</strong>pending on its own people. Relations were<br />

established with various other organizations in<br />

northern Iraq, and Öcalan personally m<strong>et</strong> with Talabani<br />

as well as other senior Kurdish lea<strong>de</strong>rs. In<br />

most talks related to the future of Kurdistan, PKK<br />

envoys were present and were also allowed to<br />

speak up their minds.<br />

In other words, the establishment of relations with<br />

the KDP alone may have changed the whole history<br />

of the organization. How then did this relationship<br />

truly begin and how much was Ankara -- unaware of<br />

what damage it would cause -- involved in the pro<br />

cess?<br />

The best way to answer this question is to look at<br />

the overall situation in the early days of 1980:

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!