Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RWISTA
STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASlN ÖZETÏ
Turkish Probe February 24, 1994
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bomb the KDP base of Zire, further provoking Kurdish
anger at Turkey.
In this period, faced with the death of many Iraqi
Kurds in subsequent Turkishoperations and aware
that together with Baghdad's own repression, Turkish
cross-border incursions and air raids were threatening
the whole of the Kurdish population, Talabani of
the PUK established his own relations with the PKK.
Since his territory or people were never directly attacked
by Turkey, he had no personal feud with Ankara.
In the late 1970s, he had even used Turkish
territory -- with local Kurdish cooperation -- to stage
attacks on Barzani's forces. In 1984, the PUK's negotiations
with Iraq had broken down and by the year
.1986, it had become member of a common front with
the KDP. In other words, it then had more say on developments
in the KDP-controlled territories as well.
Ankara's air strikes on northern Iraq continued in
1987 and the years to come. Those in March 1987,
however, caused even more damage to the KDP
with 30 air force jets bombing a number of targets in
KDP territory. Though Ankara said again that the operation
was launched against the PKK in retaliation
for new guerrilla attacks in Turkey, it came parallel to
Iran's own offensive on northern Iraq and raised
questions as to whether it had anything to do with
Turkey's alleg'ed plans to occupy the Iraqi oil fields.
But, with the air raids and constant pressure on the
Kurds, with the KDP and PUK reviving their own
cooperation with Iran, and with the PKK carrying out
its own massacre campaign in the Southeast of Turkey
directed at civilian Kurds, Ankara managed to
force the alliance between leaders of the KDP (the
PUK, which was a late comer) and PKK to collapse
in full that year. In 1987, the KDP adopted a very
harsh anti-PKK public stance, denouncing it
wherever it could.
In May that year, the Iraqi Kurdish party issued a
seven-article communique as the first formal warning
to the PKK, as required under the "Principles of Solidarity,"
before totally severing relations.
This communique read as follows:
"1. According to the principles stated in the protocol,
our party has not been informed of the developments
in the region, on strategic, political and other
issues.
"2. Committees of our party have not been informed
of the tactics and mutual practices that are
connected with practical action.
"3. The politicalline of our party has not been supported
and it has not been assisted, as promised, in
its activities abroad.
"4. A chain of problems has been created and,
specifically with the incidents in the liberated zones,
problems have been created for the forces at. the
border, their sympathizers, armed forces, the forces
of the CUD (National Democratic Front) and other
Iraqi forces.
"5. The decisions of the highest level of the CUD
have been dismissed and none of them have been
realized.
u6. From the past until now, it is clear that they (the
PKK) have adopted an aggressive attitude toward
the leadership of our party, toward its policies and
the friends of our party.
"7. Both their terrorist operations within the country
and their actions to liquidate human beings, the men- .
tality behind such action is against humanity and democracy
and is not in linewith the nationalliberation
struggle of Kurdistan. In every field and at every level,
we call upon the party organizations and the institutions
of the revolution to apply the decisions which
have beentaken.
"The Political Bureau of the Iraq Kurdistan Democrat
Party."
In a statement he made on Aug. 27,1987, Dr. Said
Ahmad Barzani, a senior KDP official, disclosed that
his party had completely severed its relations with
the PKK and continued: "The PKK's operations are
causing problemsin our relations with Turkey.
(Since) wecan be active only in areas close to the
Turkish border. Those who claim to be PKK members
... are our enemies."
Though these and a formal statement issued by
the KDP at that time would formally mark the end of
relations between the PKK and KDP. it is known that
informal relations between the two organizations still
continued up to the first half of 1992 at the grass-root
level. Öcalan, personally, was not taken by surprise
at the failing relationship with the KDP and was quick
in branding Barzani and his followers "traitors of the
Kurdish movement, enemies of the Kurdish people."
He was, however, careful to maintain his personal
contacts with Jalal Talabani. In 1987, new Turkish air
raids on northern Iraq which hit PKK camps -- but also
caused a lot of damage to the local people -- were
the final straw for the PUK, which, that year, even
went to the extent of kidnapping Turkish engineers to
force Ankara to reconsider its operations into northern
Iraq. -
That year, the PUK demanded the release of hundreds
of PKK militants in Turkish prisons and even
threatened Ankara with "reconsidering our policy to
Turkey" when Prime Minister Turgut Özal visited
Baghdad.
Possibly in retaliation for the Turkish raids and the
rapprochement between Ankara and Baghdad, the
PUK in April 1988 filled the vacuumleft behind by the
KDP and signed its own alliance with the PKK. It
must be noted here that since 1981, the PUK was receiving
Syrian aid to continue its own struggle
against Saddam Hussein and the PKK~s relations
with Damascus were very strong despite a 1987 security
protocol signed with Turkey. That year, when
Turkey and Iraq continued to cooperate "against separatistterrorism,"
Baghdad went one step further and
following the July 18, 1988 cease-fire with Tehran,
.Iaunched a massive operation on its own separatist
terrorists...
(To be continued)
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