outbreak. let's take over. american empire als wille ... - Rainer Rilling

could draw wealth and personnel from the 15 million of its subjects who
had settled in the temperate zones of the empire. Today, by contrast, fewer
than four million Americans reside abroad, and nearly all of them live in
Canada, Mexico, or Western Europe. A century ago, the United Kingdom
was a net exporter of capital, on such a scale that it truly deserved to be
called ʺthe worldʹs banker.ʺ Today, the United States is a net importer of
capital on almost as large a scale. A century ago, British leaders could devote
the lionʹs share of their attention and taxpayersʹ money to imperial
defense and grand strategy, since before 1910, government provided only
minimal care for the sick and elderly, and most of that was local. Today,
Washington spends its money on social security, defense, welfare, and
Medicare -- in that order.” 342
Von den wenigen erwähnten Ausnahmen abgesehen ist aber im gesamten
neokonservativen Feld das „Empire“ das neue legitime und oftmals stupend
stupid wie naßforsch hingeworfene Codewort geworden, das die
Einzigartigkeit der USA und ihrer Stellung im internationalen System aufruft.
„Empire“ – das ist cool. Dass die einschlägigen Positionen und Konzepte
in dieser neuen Kultur des imperialen Revisionismus jedoch wenig
konsistent und ausgearbeitet sind, ist offensichtlich und schert dabei kaum
jemand. Niemand unterscheidet gründlich zwischen nationalstaatlicher
Aktionsreichweite, globaler Hegemonie, Weltherrschaft - und was dies
alles mit der Entstehung eines Empire zu tun haben könnte. Viel wesentlicher
ist offenbar die Frage, wie eine neue Dominanzstruktur legitimiert
werden kann. Dies geschieht auf einfache und traditionelle Weise, was nebenbei
ihre simplifizierende Rezeption durch das liberale Lager durchaus
befördert. 343 Es geht um Werte. „We are the good guys“, so Boot – die USA
sind ein “gütiger Hegemon“, ein „benevolent empire“ (Kagan), ein „impe-
342
S. Niall Ferguson: Hegemony or Empire? in Foreign Affairs September/Oktober 2003. S. auch den Versuch des
Präsidenten des Nixon-Centers in Washington und Mitherausgebers der “National Interest” Dimitri K. Simes:
Americaʹs Imperial Dilemma, in: Foreign Affairs 6/2003 „Empires“ zu definieren: “empires exercise great
authority over large and varied territories populated by diverse ethnic groups, cultures, and religions. They rely on a
broad range of tools and incentives to maintain this dominance: political persuasion, economic advantage, and cultural
influence where possible; coercion and force when necessary… empires do not always have sovereignty over their
domains. This was certainly the case with Athens. It was also the case in the early period of the Roman Empire, when
Rome sought domination rather than direct control over its dependencies.”
343 Vgl. etwa die Darstellung des einflußreichen liberalen Politikwissenschaftlers John J. Mearsheimer:
Hearts and Mindes, in: The National Interest Fall 2002 (???): “Indeed, some conservatives argue that it is
time to create an American empire, where the United States dominates the entire globe and shapes it
according to its own interests. Presumably, this ambitious strategy would keep great power rivals at
bay as well as eliminate the terrorist threat. This strategy of empire is unilateralist at its core. It aims to
allow the United States to operate as freely as possible on the world stage, unconstrained by allies,
multilateral institutions or international law. It also calls for a wide-ranging war on terrorism, which
means targeting a broad array of terrorist organizations, host states and states seeking weapons of mass
destruction.The key instrument for winning that war is Americaʹs mighty military machine. Proponents
of empire believe that if the United States makes clear its willingness to use force and then wins a few
victories, other foes will either desist from active opposition or even jump on the American bandwagon.”
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