outbreak. let's take over. american empire als wille ... - Rainer Rilling

tunately, large numbers of people outside the United States--even in other
democracies--are sharply critical of American foreign policy, which is not
always benign toward them…Therefore, if the United States pursues empire,
even a democratic Pax Americana, it will end up as public enemy
number one. Second, using military force to topple regimes and replace
them with pro-American leaders is a daunting task…Third, the extensive
use of military force is no way to deal with terrorists because they make
poor targets for conventional military operations… The final problem with
fighting wars to root out terrorism is that most Americans do not have
much appetite for participating in the fight.“ 361 Eine wesentliche Rolle spielt
auch der Hinweis auf die absehbare Erfolglosigkeit einer Option des militärisch
akzentuierten politischen Unilateralismus, weil er zwingend in Widerspruch
zu den engen ökonomischen Verbindungen vor allem zwischen
den USA und Europa geraten müsse: „For all that has changed in transatlantic
relations over the past decade,“, schreibt ein Autor des Brookings-
Institute, „the core of the relationship remains largely in tact. This core consists
of a commitment to a set of values — peace, democracy, liberty, and
free enterprise — that is shared by Americans and Europeans alike. The
mutual commitment to uphold and defend these values provides the fundamental
basis of the U.S.-European relationship — it is what created the
sense of community for more than half a century. And no matter what differences
exist or may emerge across the Atlantic (or, indeed, within Europe
itself), the commitment to these values will ensure that their resolution will
be peaceful rather than by force of arms. That, given the continent’s bloody
history, is no mean achievement. Divorce is also made more difficult by the
unprecedented degree to which the United State and Europe have become
economically intertwined. On the trade side, more than a third of all U.S.
exports outside NAFTA are destined for the EU, while 27 percent of all
non-NAFTA U.S. imports originate in the EU. Twenty-seven percent of the
EU’s non-EU exports go to the United States, while almost a fifth of the
EU’s imports from outside the union come from the United States. The degree
of financial interdependence is greater still. In 2001, the EU accounted
for more than 60 percent of all foreign direct investment into the United
States (or about $800 billion), while over 45 percent of all U.S. FDI in 2001
was invested in Europe.” 362 Diese Argumentation ist weit verbreitet. Krell
verweist darauf, dass 1999 45,2 % der US-Investitionen im Ausland nach
Europa gingen und 60,5 % der europäischen Investitionen in die USA. Allein
die europäischen Investitionen in Texas sind höher als alle japanischen
Investitionen in den USA. Mehr als ein Drittel des US-Exports nach Europa
wird als firmeninterner Handel US-amerikanischer Konzerne in Europa
361
John J. Mearsheimer: Hearts and Mindes, in: The National Interest Fall 2002 (???)
362
Ivo H. Daalder: After Transatlanticism, What? München 2003
148