outbreak. let's take over. american empire als wille ... - Rainer Rilling

Herrschaft mit den Merkmalen eines „informal empire“ und das sowjetische
Imperium oprierte mit Zwang und weniger direkten Formen der Kontrolle.
Es gibt aber auch eine weichere Form und einen sanften Funktionsmodus
des Imperiums - ihm gilt die Rede vom „Empire by invitation“ oder
vom „consensual empire“ (Charles S. Meier), dem Vorzug der „seduction
to coercion“ (Juan A. Alsace) 355 , dem „Empire by Integration“ (Geir Lundestad)
356 oder der „gütige Hegemonie“ (Brzezinski). „If Empire is defined
loosely“, schreibt Ikenberry, „as a hierarchical system of political relationships
in which the most powerful state exercises decisive influence, then
the United States today indeed qualifies. If the United States is an empire,
however, it is like no other before it.” Was ist in “realistischer” liberaler
Sicht die einmalige Spezifik des so eher locker definierten amerikanischen
Imperiums? Ikenberry sieht sie darin, dass die „U.S.-led order is a negotiated
system wherein the United States has sought participation by other
states on terms that are mutually agreeable.” 357 Getauscht wurde nach I-
kenberry Sicherheit und Zugang zu einem Regime des freien Handelns
gegen Kooperation; charakteristisch für das Empire ist weiter eine Machtausübung
seitens der USA, die durch Regeln und Institutionen gebändigt
wird; und endlich die Gewährung von Voice für schwächere Staaten in der
amerikanisch geführten Ordnung, die informelle Beteiligung also an dem
Politikprozess in den USA und dem internationalen Institutionen (dass
allerdings ein Recht auf exit aus dem geschlossenen american empire nicht
existiert, erwähnt Ikenberry nicht, für den der amerikanische Militärimperialismus
„has helped (to) create a stable, open political space“). Damit aber
hat sich eine deutliche Veränderung in der Rede über die Stellung der USA
im internationalen System ergeben: wer früher die hegemoniale Position
355 Juan A. Alsace: In Search of Monsters to Destroy: American Empire in the New Millennium, in:
Parameters Herbst 2003 S.124.
356 ”First, in absolute and clearly also in relative terms, the United States emerged in 1945 as the strongest
power in centuries. Its tremendous lead over other Great Powers provided the basis for an expression
which was more comprehensive than that of the Soviet Union and in important respects also more
comprehensive than that of Britain in the 19th century. It can in fact be argued that the United States
created its own version of ʺempire.ʺ One distinguishing characteristic of this ʺempireʺ was that it was
informal; it resembled the informal parts of the British Empire. In key areas one could talk of the United
States actually being invited to play the role it did. This is what I have earlier called ʺempire by invitation.ʺ
Second, starting in the 1960s it became obvious that Americaʹs relative strength was declining and
its influence receding somewhat. In its heyday (1945-early 1960s) the United States had suffered defeats
in Eastern Europe - the Soviet backyard - and China - the worldʹs most populous country. Now it suffered
an increasing number of setbacks and outright defeats in many different regions. In part this
reflected the fact that the balance between superpower and ʺlocalʺ force was changing in favor of the
latter. In Americaʹs relations with its allies the emphasis shifted somewhat away from invitational and
cooperative arrangements against the Soviet enemy to trilateral economic disputes among the more
troubled America, an increasingly integrated Western Europe, and a Japan which now had probably the
second largest economy in the world. Yet, even in 1990 the United States was still clearly number one
among the worldʹs countries, with no clear successor in sight.” Geir Lundestadt: The American Empire”,
Oxford 1990, S.31ff.
357
G. John Ikenberry: Illusions of Empire, in: Foreign Affairs 2/2004
146