Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

The RAF in Counter-<strong>Insurgency</strong> Warfare: British Intervention in Greece, 1944-45
Naked bodies were found dumped on <strong>the</strong> side of <strong>the</strong> road <strong>and</strong> most had been ritually
mutilated (<strong>the</strong> cutting out of hearts was a common political statement). Faced with this
situation, General Scobie had no alternative but to order British troops into action. The
stated objective was to drive all insurgents out of A<strong>the</strong>ns <strong>and</strong> to restore law <strong>and</strong> order. 211
Five December saw <strong>the</strong> first role for <strong>the</strong> RAF squadrons: reconnaissance <strong>and</strong> air
interdiction of ELAS lines of communication in <strong>and</strong> out of A<strong>the</strong>ns. Although ELAS had
control of most of <strong>the</strong> countryside by this point, <strong>the</strong>y were extremely vulnerable to air
attack, <strong>and</strong> were, <strong>the</strong>refore, compelled to do most of <strong>the</strong>ir moves under cover of darkness.
They were also very short of motorised transport, so only <strong>the</strong>ir most important logistics
travelled by this means, while general stores <strong>and</strong> food were transported by horse or mule
<strong>and</strong> sometimes by ELAS fighters <strong>the</strong>mselves. There was a conscious effort by <strong>the</strong> RAF to
interdict ELAS Lines of Communication out to a distance of 70 miles in order to isolate
<strong>the</strong> battlefield <strong>and</strong> make <strong>the</strong> insurgency “wi<strong>the</strong>r on <strong>the</strong> vine”. This was feasible because
<strong>the</strong> Royal Navy had a number of vessels exercising sea control, including HMS Ajax, <strong>and</strong>
<strong>the</strong> RAF was also performing anti-shipping operations in <strong>the</strong> eastern Mediterranean. As a
consequence, ELAS vessels had difficulty circumventing this blockade. Long-range aerial
reconnaissance occurred at least once a day from 5 December, with a particular focus on
<strong>the</strong> approaches to A<strong>the</strong>ns from <strong>the</strong> north <strong>and</strong> also from <strong>the</strong> Peloponnese, <strong>and</strong> a picture
of ELAS supply routes <strong>and</strong> supply dumps became apparent. This was comparatively easy
in relation to ELAS motorised <strong>and</strong> horse-drawn transport because <strong>the</strong> road infrastructure
was limited to a h<strong>and</strong>ful of main arterial roads feeding into A<strong>the</strong>ns. The same can be
said of <strong>the</strong> Greek rail network, which was limited to one principal north-south rail line.
Because most rolling stock had been plundered by <strong>the</strong> German occupying forces, very
little remained intact by 1944 <strong>and</strong> movement by rail was comparatively rare. 212
By 6 December, not only had <strong>the</strong> Communists secured <strong>the</strong> countryside around A<strong>the</strong>ns,
but British forces found <strong>the</strong>mselves surrounded by what were described as “very thorough
<strong>and</strong> determined” ELAS forces in <strong>the</strong> centre of A<strong>the</strong>ns, inside, in effect, a “Green Zone”
which measured two miles by 1.5 miles. 213 The only means of re-supply was via tank <strong>and</strong>
armoured car convoys back <strong>and</strong> forth to <strong>the</strong> Hassani airfield, five miles to <strong>the</strong> south-east
(which subsequently became A<strong>the</strong>ns airport), down a single roadway. This roadway was
subjected to mortar <strong>and</strong> artillery fire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), <strong>and</strong> captured
German mines were laid under <strong>the</strong> cover of darkness. By 11 December, <strong>the</strong> besieged
British <strong>and</strong> friendly forces had less than three days’ supply of ammunition left. It was
increasingly obvious that an alternative had to be found. The RAF was called upon to
perform a massive re-supply <strong>and</strong> airdrop, beginning on 12 December, enabling troops
to secure ground around A<strong>the</strong>ns, especially crucial lines of communication to <strong>the</strong> sea,
at Phaleron Bay. At this stage, ELAS forces were in complete control of <strong>the</strong> main port
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”