Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 6
two to five minutes, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong> almost continuous reporting done by civilians could be
confirmed immediately. Although civilian reports were almost always well intentioned,
<strong>the</strong>y were sometimes inaccurate <strong>and</strong> often late, so aerial reconnaissance proved to be
an important means for <strong>the</strong> Army of economising on effort. The Army was also of <strong>the</strong>
opinion that aerial reconnaissance, by maintaining a continuous watch for enemy guns
<strong>and</strong> mortars, kept insurgent activity to a minimum, <strong>and</strong> aircraft such as <strong>the</strong> Beaufighter,
which could stay on station for a number of hours if required, was a particularly valuable
asset in this respect. 221
The persistence of this air reconnaissance over A<strong>the</strong>ns had ano<strong>the</strong>r important impact.
The insurgents came to associate reconnaissance aircraft with attacks, as <strong>the</strong> two effects
of reconnaissance <strong>and</strong> attack were usually close in space <strong>and</strong> time. This was increasingly
<strong>the</strong> case during December, as reconnaissance aircraft were often armed <strong>and</strong> performed
<strong>the</strong>ir own attacks. Unless insurgent groups were particularly conversant with aircraft
types <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir potential weapon loads, <strong>the</strong>y could never be absolutely certain whe<strong>the</strong>r
an aircraft overhead was purely benign or not. Therefore, by <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> month, any
type of aircraft tended to have a coercive impact. 222
By <strong>the</strong> last week of December 1944, <strong>the</strong> levels of precision attack achieved by aircrews were
such that insurgents would often flee from buildings, ab<strong>and</strong>oning <strong>the</strong>ir weapons, if <strong>the</strong>y
knew that an aircraft was in <strong>the</strong> vicinity. Local civilians reported that ELAS fighters would
run down a street, banging on doors, begging for shelter until <strong>the</strong> danger of aircraft attack
had passed. A week later, “shows of force” by aircraft were, on many occasions, sufficient
to compel insurgents to give up without a fight. A number of important observations may
be made here. First, “shows of force” worked because <strong>the</strong> insurgents came to underst<strong>and</strong>
<strong>the</strong> violence of air power that could be brought to bear against <strong>the</strong>m. Second, <strong>the</strong> way
in which “shows of force” ultimately had <strong>the</strong> same effect as physical attack (causing
insurgents to disperse or give up) meant that <strong>the</strong> British forces could reduce <strong>the</strong> amount
of destructive effect as <strong>the</strong> campaign progressed. This was an important information
operations coup because it reinforced <strong>the</strong> stated policy of General Scobie, namely, that
British forces intervened to preserve democracy, <strong>and</strong> to provide security <strong>and</strong> humanitarian
relief for <strong>the</strong> local populace. General Scobie repeatedly emphasised <strong>the</strong> importance of
<strong>the</strong> British forces keeping <strong>the</strong>ir word, namely that <strong>the</strong>y were in A<strong>the</strong>ns to deal with <strong>the</strong>
insurgency <strong>and</strong> that every care would be taken to minimise collateral damage. 223
During <strong>the</strong> last week of December, <strong>the</strong> main fighting was occurring in <strong>the</strong> port area,
Piraeus, <strong>and</strong> around <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn approaches to A<strong>the</strong>ns city centre. Some of this fighting
was still characterised by fanatical defence of positions. On 24 December, for example,
three Spitfires were compelled to make thirty attacks on a building in <strong>the</strong> Lykabettus area
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 107