Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”
360. Amos Harel, “IAF chiefs admit air power can’t subdue rocket fire,” Ha’aretz,
4 August 2006.
361. Max Boot, “The Second Lebanon War,” The Weekly St<strong>and</strong>ard, 4 September 2006.
362. Yuval Steinitz, “The war that was led astray,” Ha’aretz, 17 August 2006.
363. The idea is similar to “coercion by punishment,” or targeting population centres
with <strong>the</strong> intent of wearing down <strong>the</strong> civilians’ will <strong>and</strong> commitment to fight. See
Pape, Bombing to Win. For coercion specific to Lebanon, see Thom Schanker, “To
Disarm Shadowy Guerilla Army, Israeli <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> May Not be Enough,” New York
Times, 20 July 2006, p. A10.
364. Steinitz, “The War That Was Led Astray.”
365. The official Israel Defense Forces website suggests that Operation Change
of Direction was intended to achieve <strong>the</strong>se two strategic objectives. See <strong>the</strong> July
2006 summary of IDF events:
http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=7&docid=59888.EN
366. Ari Shavit, “A Spirit of Absolute Folly,” Ha’aretz, 16 August 2006.
367. Ibid.
368. Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard <strong>and</strong> Peter Paret, eds, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 75-76.
369. Shavit, “A Spirit of Absolute Folly.”
370. Daniel Byman <strong>and</strong> Steven Simon provide an excellent account of <strong>the</strong> Lebanon
campaign in “The No-Win Zone: An After-Action Report from Lebanon,”
The National Interest, Vol. 86, November/December 2006, pp. 55-61.
371. A central <strong>the</strong>me of Thomas Schelling’s Strategies of Conflict is <strong>the</strong> idea of
commitment, which he argues is key to promises, threats, bargaining, <strong>and</strong>
deterrence <strong>and</strong> creating an expectation about how <strong>the</strong> actor will behave in a
particular setting. In this sense, <strong>the</strong> IDF’s retaliation served to reinforce <strong>the</strong>
expectation that it will respond when attacked militarily. Strategies of Conflict
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”