Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Notes <strong>and</strong> Sources
501. For a study of Templer’s <strong>and</strong> Harding’s leadership in counter-insurgency
operations see James Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counter-insurgency:
A Tale of Two Insurgencies (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,
March 2006).
502. I have polled students at <strong>the</strong> US Army Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> General Staff College,
talked with Philippine officers fighting insurgents on Luzon <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn
Philippines, <strong>and</strong> talked with NATO officers dealing with insurgents in Afghanistan.
All single out our weakness in using <strong>the</strong> media to get across <strong>the</strong> government
message to <strong>the</strong> population.
503. Richard McKenna, The S<strong>and</strong> Pebbles (1962 Reprint: Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 2000) p. 343.
504. Chair, Seán MacBride, Israel in Lebanon: Report of <strong>the</strong> International Commissions to
Enquire into Reported Violations of International Law by Israel during its Invasion
of Lebanon (London: The International Commission, 1983), p. 147. The international c
ommission noted that <strong>the</strong> PLO had placed flak guns on top of civilian building,
but said that attacks on such targets were illegal as <strong>the</strong> guns posed no threat. In
fact, <strong>the</strong> Israeli <strong>Air</strong> Force lost several aircraft to AA fire.
505. Ibid., pp. 104, 146, 190-91.
506. For examples of <strong>the</strong> broad agitation in <strong>the</strong> west to ban cluster bombs, see: Editorial,
“No Place for Cluster Bombs” New York Times, 26 August 2006; “Norway Plans
Talks on Cluster-Bomb Ban” Washington Times, 18 November 2006.
507. In 2004 <strong>the</strong> US Army changed its views on <strong>the</strong> importance of media operations. The
interim counter-insurgency doctrine published that year stated that in counterinsurgency
<strong>the</strong> psychological operations officer is now to be considered as
a primary staff officer. See FM 3.07.22 (2004) Chapter 5, pages 5-1 to 5-5, deal with
psychological operations. These are described as “an integral part” of <strong>the</strong>
comm<strong>and</strong>er’s plan <strong>and</strong> operations.
508. FM 3-24 Counter-insurgency (2006), Chapter 1, paragraph 153.
509. On <strong>the</strong> campaign of <strong>the</strong> Royal Laotian <strong>Air</strong> Force against <strong>the</strong> Ho Chi Minh trail
see Jacob van Staaveren, Interdiction in Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Laos (Washington: Center for <strong>Air</strong>
Force History, 1993), pp. 209, 214. Supported by <strong>the</strong> USAF 606th Composite
squadron, <strong>and</strong> flying ten A-26s <strong>and</strong> ten T-28s, between July 1966 <strong>and</strong> February
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 297