Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Insurgency</strong>: Early RAF Doctrine
1919-1922, 1923-1928, 1929-1931 <strong>and</strong> 1932-1938. Then, within each of <strong>the</strong>se eras, extracts
from <strong>the</strong> sources already mentioned can be used to identify <strong>the</strong> key changes to <strong>the</strong> RAF’s
approach, or at least to <strong>the</strong> approach that was being taught, in strictly chronological order,
thus enabling some general conclusions to be drawn about <strong>the</strong> changes in RAF thinking
over <strong>the</strong> entire period.
The first three years of <strong>the</strong> RAF’s existence certainly did not see a plethora of material
being produced on <strong>the</strong> subject of counter-insurgency, although <strong>the</strong> same can actually
be said for all doctrinal matters. What was issued during this period included a small
number of <strong>Air</strong> Staff Notes, <strong>and</strong> some of <strong>the</strong>se certainly looked at aspects of <strong>the</strong> subject,
for instance one was issued in 1920 on operations along <strong>the</strong> Indian Frontier, <strong>and</strong> in
1921 <strong>the</strong> effects of aerial bombardment on tribesmen were also being considered. 39
However, our main area of interest is that very first RAF doctrine document, CD 22.
The final chapter, quaintly-titled, at least in modern terms, “<strong>Air</strong>craft in Warfare against
an Uncivilised Enemy,” contains <strong>the</strong> RAF’s first coherent set of thoughts in this area.
Although operations in 1919 in British Somalil<strong>and</strong> against Mohammed bin Abdullah
Hassan, more popularly known in <strong>the</strong> British press at <strong>the</strong> time as <strong>the</strong> “Mad Mullah,” had
been an undoubted success, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> RAF had been in charge of Iraq since 1921, <strong>the</strong>re
was still not a great deal of counter-insurgency experience within <strong>the</strong> Service at this
point. Yet from <strong>the</strong> very start it was formally recognised as a doctrinal position that such
operations would almost always require joint action:
The role of aircraft in operations of this nature will be a major one,
though it is unlikely that <strong>the</strong>y
will be in a position to undertake a campaign entirely independent
of military assistance. 40
The assumption was that this would generally be under RAF comm<strong>and</strong>. It was also
recognised that <strong>the</strong> principles of regular warfare would have to be “considerably modified,”
which was <strong>the</strong> main thrust of <strong>the</strong> chapter’s contents. The overall tenor was very definitely
focused on attack activities:
<strong>the</strong> force in <strong>the</strong> field must first be attacked <strong>and</strong> destroyed. This
should <strong>the</strong>n be followed up by continuous bombing of his capital
<strong>and</strong> subsequently <strong>the</strong> surrounding villages, crops <strong>and</strong> live stock. 41
The importance of <strong>the</strong> morale factor is stressed throughout, as, unsurprisingly, is <strong>the</strong>
need for a vigorous offensive (a particularly Trenchardian phrase). A clear stress is placed
on <strong>the</strong> need for concentration of force, particularly with regard to <strong>the</strong> greater efficiency
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”