Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 4
As Malaya was a work in progress, many tactics were transferred to Kenya as <strong>the</strong>ir benefits
became evident against <strong>the</strong> MRLA. The application of air power was no exception.
A mysterious branch of <strong>the</strong> Kikuyu tribe, Mau Mau had its roots in <strong>the</strong> Kenyan l<strong>and</strong> reform
movement <strong>and</strong> in <strong>the</strong> early 1950s began to vent its frustrations at <strong>the</strong> colonial government.
Its intentions, much like <strong>the</strong> movement as a whole, remained porous, ensuring that
Mau Mau was concomitantly labelled reformist, nationalist, anti-colonial <strong>and</strong> Kikuyu
supremacist. British propag<strong>and</strong>a managed to propound a common perception of Mau
Mau as an atavistic <strong>and</strong> savage group with no regard for life. The early British response
to increased Mau Mau violence at <strong>the</strong> outbreak of <strong>the</strong> Emergency was <strong>the</strong> mass arrest
of Mau Mau sympathisers as well as of leaders of <strong>the</strong> trade unions <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> nationalist
movement. This left Mau Mau with an inexperienced <strong>and</strong> semi-educated leadership with
no contact with <strong>the</strong> established hierarchy. Yet <strong>the</strong> British response was hindered by an
inefficient intelligence network <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> lack of a clear strategy, stemming largely from
an arrogant perception that Mau Mau were tame in comparison to <strong>the</strong> MCP <strong>and</strong> would
<strong>the</strong>refore be easy to defeat. Recent scholarship on <strong>the</strong> Mau Mau uprising has sought to
expose institutional <strong>and</strong> widespread brutality that pervaded <strong>the</strong> treatment of Mau Mau
suspects, although this contemporary literature retains <strong>the</strong> tendency of previous works to
largely ignore <strong>the</strong> role, albeit a more limited one than in Malaya, played by air power. 144
Like <strong>the</strong> Malayan jungle, <strong>the</strong> dense forests around Mount Kenya, <strong>the</strong> centre of <strong>the</strong> Mau
Mau’s rural campaign, provided excellent shelter for insurgents. Their movement was also
aided by existing, well-trodden animal tracks. This was to prove problematic for <strong>the</strong> small
group of aircraft at <strong>the</strong> disposal of <strong>the</strong> British <strong>and</strong> Kenyan security forces. At <strong>the</strong> outbreak
of <strong>the</strong> Emergency <strong>the</strong>re was fourteen light aircraft belonging to <strong>the</strong> Kenya Police <strong>Air</strong> Wing,
four Harvards seconded from <strong>the</strong> RAF based in Rhodesia, <strong>and</strong> a squadron of RAF Lincoln
bombers. The Kenya Police <strong>Air</strong> Wing largely fulfilled a transportation function, whilst
medical evacuation was only undertaken sporadically given both <strong>the</strong> geographically
confined region of military operations allowing for easier removal from <strong>the</strong> conflict zone
by foot patrols, <strong>and</strong> also by <strong>the</strong> late introduction of helicopters to Kenya in <strong>the</strong> closing
stages of serious anti-Mau Mau operations by <strong>the</strong> mid-1950s.
The use of light aircraft (mainly for transportation reasons) over populated areas
provided visible signs to <strong>the</strong> civilian community, both settler <strong>and</strong> native loyalist, that
action was being taken without fright or alienation. The use of bombers over civilian
areas was avoided, even after <strong>the</strong> RAF stepped up its bombing campaign of <strong>the</strong> Aberdare
Mountains, a Mau Mau stronghold, in <strong>the</strong> summer of 1953. Up to ten Harvards <strong>and</strong> four
Lincolns were used in <strong>the</strong> raids. 145 In light of this desire to find a fine balance between
direct aerial counter-insurgent action <strong>and</strong> alienating <strong>the</strong> native loyalist community, <strong>the</strong>re
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 75