Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 12
insurgency. 514
In <strong>the</strong> 94-page new USAF counter-insurgency doctrine, <strong>the</strong> issue of
providing appropriate equipment to less developed allies is not even addressed. Simply
put, <strong>the</strong> Army/Marine doctrine recognises that effective counter-insurgency is not just
about using US forces, but about helping allied nations win <strong>the</strong>ir own wars. Allied nations
threatened with insurgency need <strong>the</strong>ir own air forces. Unfortunately, US aircraft <strong>and</strong>
systems are too expensive <strong>and</strong> sophisticated for less developed nations to operate <strong>and</strong>
maintain.
What kind of aircraft <strong>and</strong> systems do small allied nations need? Ideally, <strong>the</strong>y should be
simple <strong>and</strong> easy to maintain, survivable, able to operate from rough airfields, <strong>and</strong> be capable
of operating in <strong>the</strong> strike or surveillance roles. In <strong>the</strong> years after World War II <strong>and</strong> Vietnam,
<strong>the</strong> US had plenty of surplus aircraft that fit <strong>the</strong> bill. Yet today, we no longer have such
aircraft in our inventory. One solution is to design <strong>and</strong> build a new counter-insurgency
aircraft suitable for small, allied nations. Luckily, American initiative is not dead. In late
2003, a group of designers <strong>and</strong> manufacturers formed <strong>the</strong> US <strong>Air</strong>craft Corporation <strong>and</strong>
began a project to build a simple <strong>and</strong> inexpensive counter-insurgency aircraft. The result is
<strong>the</strong> A-67 Dragon, a light two-seater turboprop that is specifically designed for survivability
(armoured cockpit), light strike <strong>and</strong> long endurance. Its simplicity ensures that a less
developed air force can operate <strong>and</strong> maintain it. Its low cost will make it possible for <strong>the</strong>
US to provide it in adequate numbers to allied nations. The A-67 has incorporated several
features that are essential for counter-insurgency. It has an exceptionally long endurance,
over ten hours, which means that it can keep a large area under surveillance for a long
time. Using of aircraft in <strong>the</strong> surveillance <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ing patrol missions have historically
been some of <strong>the</strong> most effective means of observing insurgent activity <strong>and</strong> inhibiting
insurgent movement <strong>and</strong> activity. The trained observer in <strong>the</strong> backseat with high power
lenses is still a very effective means of monitoring ground activity. It might not be as good
as some of our high-technology systems, but it is something that a less developed nation
can easily operate.
However, while a light, multi-purpose aircraft such as <strong>the</strong> A-67 Dragon can effectively
carry out most counter-insurgency missions, <strong>the</strong>re still remains <strong>the</strong> requirement for
effective close air support of ground troops. While a light strike aeroplane can fulfil some
of <strong>the</strong>se functions, a heavier aircraft such as <strong>the</strong> gunship is best suited for a developing
nation’s air force in conducting <strong>the</strong> close air support mission. There are several reasons
why gunships are a preferred solution. First of all, a number of twin-engine transports
have been modified as gunships <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y have proven highly effective in combat. In El
Salvador’s civil war (1881-1992) <strong>the</strong> AC-47, an old modified C-47 transport armed with
three .50 calibre machine guns, proved to be <strong>the</strong> most accurate close air support weapon
of <strong>the</strong> war. It is fairly easy <strong>and</strong> inexpensive to modify a modern twin engine transport as a
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 221