Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

The RAF in Counter-<strong>Insurgency</strong> Warfare: British Intervention in Greece, 1944-45
of <strong>the</strong> city before <strong>the</strong>y could dislodge <strong>the</strong> insurgents. In <strong>the</strong> port area, because insurgent
positions were by <strong>the</strong>n well defined, British forces were able to apply Joint fires. For
<strong>the</strong> first time, on 21 December, Spitfires were used to perform gun-ranging for HMS
Ajax, which was called upon to shell insurgent strongholds. Mopping up attacks were
<strong>the</strong>n performed by <strong>the</strong> same aircraft. In o<strong>the</strong>r air attacks, rocket-equipped Beaufighters
hit insurgent positions in close proximity to friendly forces, which allowed <strong>the</strong> army to
capitalise on <strong>the</strong> shock effect of <strong>the</strong> air attacks by immediately following up with tank
or artillery fire. Both air <strong>and</strong> ground reports testified to <strong>the</strong> “high degree” of precision
achieved by aircraft in <strong>the</strong>se attacks on insurgent strong-points, <strong>and</strong> how <strong>the</strong> morale of
British troops increased as a result. The boost in morale came about, in large part, because
this was <strong>the</strong> first time British l<strong>and</strong> forces had <strong>the</strong> initiative <strong>and</strong> established an offensive
tempo. Important observations were made, especially about <strong>the</strong> psychological benefit of
aerial attack for <strong>the</strong> morale of one’s own l<strong>and</strong> forces. 224
The limited offensive operations which became feasible during <strong>the</strong> last days of 1944
produced important results. A large part of south-west A<strong>the</strong>ns had been cleared of
insurgents, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> retaking of <strong>the</strong> port area was within sight. All Source intelligence
analysis was also showing that some insurgent units were retreating from <strong>the</strong> city, <strong>and</strong>
that ELAS was trying to decide whe<strong>the</strong>r to make a final st<strong>and</strong> in A<strong>the</strong>ns, in <strong>the</strong> hope
of forcing a decision, or to withdraw all ELAS units to <strong>the</strong> surrounding countryside.
General Scobie’s staff believed that <strong>the</strong> latter course of action was <strong>the</strong> most probable, <strong>and</strong>
this proved to be a correct judgement. Human intelligence <strong>and</strong> IMINT derived reports
showed that most of ELAS began to withdraw to <strong>the</strong> outskirts of A<strong>the</strong>ns between 26
<strong>and</strong> 27 December. Armed with this intelligence, General Scobie decided to increase <strong>the</strong>
tempo of operations, with <strong>the</strong> aim of clearing <strong>the</strong> south-east of A<strong>the</strong>ns. The British push
began on <strong>the</strong> night of 27/28 December, driving eastwards from <strong>the</strong> centre of <strong>the</strong> city. In
<strong>the</strong> district of Kaisariani, referred to by <strong>the</strong> Communists as “Little Stalingrad” <strong>and</strong> where
<strong>the</strong>y resolved to fight to <strong>the</strong> death, ELAS suffered heavy casualties <strong>and</strong> scattered units
retreated into <strong>the</strong> hills. 225
By 31 December, combined British <strong>and</strong> Greek forces (including <strong>the</strong> Greek 3rd Mountain
Brigade <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Greek security forces) had established a continuous front in <strong>the</strong>
nor<strong>the</strong>rn suburbs of A<strong>the</strong>ns <strong>and</strong> down to <strong>the</strong> sea. Pockets of determined resistance
remained in areas such as Piraeus, but, in general, <strong>the</strong> insurgents had been forced out
into <strong>the</strong> open. Whereas <strong>the</strong> insurgents’ tactics in <strong>the</strong> urban setting had previously denied
<strong>the</strong> full application of air power, artillery <strong>and</strong> tank support, firepower was increasingly
brought to bear. General Scobie’s stated aim now was to “establish law <strong>and</strong> order <strong>and</strong>
protect <strong>the</strong> population against fur<strong>the</strong>r incursions by ELAS.” 226 It was emphasised that
all operations had to be governed by <strong>the</strong> necessity of “giving full protection <strong>and</strong> good
108
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”