Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 9
The ineffectiveness of such restraint – air power in <strong>the</strong> case of Lebanon – presented Israeli
military planners with a conundrum. If using <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>-off, lower-risk strategy of air power
were ineffective in degrading <strong>the</strong> enemy’s capabilities, but ground forces were likely to
sustain heavy losses <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore not domestically nor internationally palatable in response
to a small-scale terrorist attack or in this case troop capture, what was <strong>the</strong> optimal course
of action?
Unfortunately, this was <strong>the</strong> corner into which <strong>the</strong> Israeli leadership had painted itself. Once
it decided to launch a retaliatory strike against Hezbollah in exchange for <strong>the</strong> capture of
two Israeli soldiers, its strategic options became limited. While it was incumbent upon <strong>the</strong>
leadership to develop a strategy that would achieve <strong>the</strong> objectives of retrieving <strong>the</strong> soldiers
<strong>and</strong> disarming Hezbollah, <strong>the</strong> leadership <strong>and</strong> domestic audience were unprepared for a
l<strong>and</strong>-based strategy that was likely to yield higher casualties. Ari Shavit laments that Israel
had become “a country for which not many are willing to kill <strong>and</strong> be killed.”
The interim report of <strong>the</strong> Winograd Commission confirms this perspective. The
Commission found that:
Some of <strong>the</strong> political <strong>and</strong> military elites in Israel have reached
<strong>the</strong> conclusion that Israel is beyond <strong>the</strong> era of wars. Given <strong>the</strong>se
assumptions, <strong>the</strong> IDF did not need to be prepared for ‘real’ war. There
was also no urgent need to update in a systematic <strong>and</strong> sophisticated
way Israel’s overall security strategy <strong>and</strong> to consider how to mobilize
<strong>and</strong> combine all its resources <strong>and</strong> sources of strength – political,
economic, social, military, spiritual, cultural <strong>and</strong> scientific – to
address <strong>the</strong> totality of <strong>the</strong> challenges it faces.
The very nature of a war makes bloodshed likely. While acting within <strong>the</strong> bounds of
proportionality, <strong>the</strong> state leadership’s business is to provide for <strong>the</strong> state’s security <strong>and</strong> win
wars, identifying strategic objectives <strong>and</strong> matching those with appropriate instruments
even if those instruments involve casualties. In <strong>the</strong> case of Lebanon, mentalities favoured
economic <strong>and</strong> social stability <strong>and</strong> preferences for low civilian casualties constrained
options; leaders ei<strong>the</strong>r needed to adjust that mentality to accord with reality or perhaps
not launch a war unless it was willing to use <strong>the</strong> means necessary to win.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Lebanon: Successes <strong>and</strong> Failures
Though <strong>the</strong> efficacy of air power has been challenged in <strong>the</strong> wake of Lebanon, it should
be defended against accusations that it was a categorical failure. The IDF, operating
primarily through its air assets, is thought to have eliminated about 500 of Hezbollah’s
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 149