Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

The use of <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> Today: Have New Ethical Challenges Occurred?
is intelligence, <strong>and</strong> intelligence is analyzing <strong>the</strong> effects of air operations”. 542 In <strong>the</strong> US
Marine Corps doctrine publication covering intelligence, it is defined as knowledge. 543
And knowledge <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> interpretation of intelligence data is an activity for humans. In
selecting targets air power is dependent on correct information. In complex situations
<strong>and</strong> circumstances <strong>the</strong>re can be problems concerning both <strong>the</strong> identification <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>
allocation of <strong>the</strong> target. One issue is <strong>the</strong> originator of <strong>the</strong> information about <strong>the</strong> target. In
Afghanistan during <strong>the</strong> most intense phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, it occurred
that some target information was delivered from local Afghan supporters. 544
Even if
<strong>the</strong>re were western coalition forces on <strong>the</strong> ground, it was difficult for <strong>the</strong>m to assess <strong>the</strong>
reliability of <strong>the</strong> information. 545 There were instances where bombs were dropped on <strong>the</strong>
basis of invalid information. There was speculation that <strong>the</strong> aim of <strong>the</strong> given information
was to get rid of local Afghan rivals; those not supporting <strong>the</strong> goals of <strong>the</strong> operation.
Personnel requesting, approving <strong>and</strong> delivering ordnance have <strong>the</strong> ethical responsibility
to verify <strong>the</strong> validity of <strong>the</strong> information .546 When information which has been collected is
unreliable <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> use of force is applied on <strong>the</strong> basis of this information it can be a short
distance to an unethical effect.
The need to strike emerging targets rapidly made US forces in Afghanistan short-cut <strong>the</strong>
targeting process <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n rely upon unverified information before striking a target. 547
One cruel example was <strong>the</strong> bombing of an Afghan wedding party in <strong>the</strong> summer of
2002. 548 Therefore, <strong>the</strong>re are two pitfalls concerning intelligence serving as a basis for
precision guided munitions: <strong>the</strong> reliability of <strong>the</strong> intelligence <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> aspect of correct
target identification. These two circumstances are perhaps nothing new or particular to
<strong>the</strong> use of air power. Yet as <strong>the</strong> conditions of <strong>the</strong> battle environment require that rapid
decisions should be taken, <strong>the</strong>se circumstances should be considered part of <strong>the</strong> ethical
responsibility of <strong>the</strong> decision makers.
As already mentioned, <strong>the</strong>re are a number of aspects while h<strong>and</strong>ling <strong>the</strong> complexity of
air power which constitute ethical pitfalls. <strong>Air</strong> power – due to <strong>the</strong> altitude from which
it operates – is totally dependent on correct information. Intelligence has one implicit
task <strong>and</strong> that is to minimise <strong>the</strong> uncertainty <strong>and</strong> prevent unethical judgments from
being made.
Technical Limitations
Precision-guided munitions, enhanced surveillance capability <strong>and</strong> communication,
UCAVs, in o<strong>the</strong>r words state-of-<strong>the</strong>-art technology, have laid <strong>the</strong> foundation for <strong>the</strong>
striking of <strong>the</strong> correct targets <strong>and</strong> avoiding collateral damage. Yet technology is used by
humans <strong>and</strong> we as operators of technology should be aware of its possibilities as well as
its limitations. Perhaps <strong>the</strong> technology <strong>and</strong> our trust in it affect our decisions concerning
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”