Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 8
much of <strong>the</strong> conflict, Soviet transport aircraft lacked countermeasures, <strong>and</strong> Aeroflot civil
aircraft, which were also used for <strong>the</strong> transport role, had none whatsoever. 300 A similar
mission was performed by <strong>the</strong> Hinds in conjunction with <strong>the</strong> Hips with <strong>the</strong> latter playing
<strong>the</strong> Matsurov role drawing Mujahideen fire to expose <strong>the</strong> rebel position which would <strong>the</strong>n
be pulverised by <strong>the</strong> Mi-24s. 301
In battle, <strong>the</strong> Hind flyers did everything <strong>the</strong>y could to maximise <strong>the</strong>ir effect. Helicopters
would fly over <strong>the</strong> targets singularly in quick succession, pulling up after an attack with
<strong>the</strong>ir wingman’s rockets <strong>and</strong> machinegun bullets zooming past <strong>the</strong>ir aircraft. 302 Avenues
of approach were changed to keep <strong>the</strong> rebels off balance as to <strong>the</strong> direction of <strong>the</strong> next
attack; a tactic also used by fighter-bombers. The aircraft would operate in flights of four,
or in groups of eight, over areas where <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen enjoyed good cover from <strong>the</strong>
terrain <strong>and</strong> foliage. 303
During <strong>the</strong> desant, <strong>the</strong> Hinds would fly to <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>ing area first, bludgeoning any
opposition encountered on <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>and</strong> around <strong>the</strong> L<strong>and</strong>ing Zones (LZs), flying up
to 1,312-ft. (400-m.) above <strong>the</strong> transport helicopter force to keep a good watch on <strong>the</strong>
terrain below. In addition to <strong>the</strong> Hinds escorting <strong>the</strong> desant, ano<strong>the</strong>r flight of up to four
helicopters would remain at a nearby airfield or a makeshift strip ready to take flight
should <strong>the</strong> call come in for more air support or should <strong>the</strong> primary Hind force run out
of ammunition. 304
However, despite <strong>the</strong>ir impressive arms <strong>and</strong> armour, <strong>the</strong> Mi-24V was not invincible. Some
bright spark had decided to position <strong>the</strong> large Red Star insignia carried by <strong>the</strong> aircraft
directly over <strong>the</strong> oil tank, giving <strong>the</strong> rebels a nice target to aim for. Exposed air intakes were
ano<strong>the</strong>r good aim-point. Yet <strong>the</strong> Hind crews were clever. They painted over <strong>the</strong> Red Star
before combat <strong>and</strong> simply replaced <strong>the</strong> insignia during official inspections. 305 Ano<strong>the</strong>r weak
point of <strong>the</strong> aircraft was its lack of rear defence. This caused problems as <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen
would often fire at <strong>the</strong> aircraft after it had made a strafing pass or rocket run over <strong>the</strong>ir
position. One proposal had been to install a rear-facing machine gun at <strong>the</strong> back of <strong>the</strong>
helicopter’s troop compartment which could be fired by <strong>the</strong> aircraft’s third crew member
from a small gangway. It is noteworthy that <strong>the</strong> aircraft did not carry troops in Afghanistan
because of weight considerations. Flight testing of <strong>the</strong> concept revealed that this area was
awash with exhaust fumes <strong>and</strong> thus very uncomfortable for <strong>the</strong> operator. It was even more
uncomfortable for one overweight Soviet general who got stuck in <strong>the</strong> gangway when
inspecting <strong>the</strong> machinegun installation. The idea was quietly ab<strong>and</strong>oned. 306
In terms of MANPADS, <strong>the</strong> aircraft were vulnerable to <strong>the</strong> Chinese <strong>and</strong> Egyptian 9K32
Strela-2 (SA-7A “Grail”) systems which were covertly supplied to <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen by its
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 133