Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force Operations in South-West Arabia 1917-1967
RAF <strong>Air</strong>craft Based at Aden 1920-1964
Year 1924 1928 1939 1945 1956 1964
Operational <strong>Air</strong>craft 6 12 32 24 20 54
Support <strong>Air</strong>craft - - 2 9 14 30
Total <strong>Air</strong>craft 6 12 34 33 34 84
According to one author, <strong>the</strong> authorities in Aden deliberately aimed to provoke <strong>the</strong>
Yemenis into border incursions that could <strong>the</strong>n be dealt with using superior ground <strong>and</strong>
air forces. The intention was to create sufficient chaos within Yemen to divert <strong>the</strong> Imam
from continuing to support <strong>the</strong> rebellious tribes. 108 The fighting reached a climax in 1959
with <strong>the</strong> bombing <strong>and</strong> occupation of <strong>the</strong> Yemeni village of Am Soma (near Al Beihan).
This resulted in a much more cautious <strong>and</strong> defensive policy on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> Yemenis
<strong>and</strong> a substantial reduction in support for <strong>the</strong> rebellious tribes of <strong>the</strong> Western Aden
Protectorate, at least until <strong>the</strong> toppling of <strong>the</strong> Imam in 1962.
As a parallel strategy, it was also decided to create greater political stability by establishing
a tribal federation. This came into being in 1959, originally with six states, later twelve,
largely drawn from <strong>the</strong> Western Aden Protectorate (only one of <strong>the</strong> states from <strong>the</strong>
Eastern Aden Protectorate joined). It was a worthy initiative that might have prospered
ten years earlier. In reality, <strong>the</strong> Federation proved ineffective <strong>and</strong> did not outlast <strong>the</strong>
British withdrawal.
The same year could also be regarded as marking <strong>the</strong> formal end of air control in Aden, at
least in regard to <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> arrangements. The increasing military presence <strong>and</strong> wider
organisational changes led to <strong>the</strong> creation of a Unified Comm<strong>and</strong>, “Headquarters British
Forces, Arabian Peninsula” in October 1959. No longer would <strong>the</strong> RAF have sole authority
in Aden. The reality was that <strong>the</strong> “traditional” methods of air control had been on <strong>the</strong> wane
since <strong>the</strong> early 1940s, superseded by ever larger air-l<strong>and</strong> operations.
<strong>Insurgency</strong>
We have seen how British authority in Aden <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Protectorates was increasingly
threatened by external factors, particularly <strong>the</strong> rise in Arab nationalism. The end of <strong>the</strong>
M<strong>and</strong>ate in Palestine created a widespread suspicion of British intentions while <strong>the</strong> “Free
Officers” movement, led by Nasser, provided a focus for Arab grievances. The subsequent
debacle at Suez did nothing to improve British prestige or to dampen Nasser’s enthusiasm
for removing <strong>the</strong> residual colonial presence in <strong>the</strong> Middle East.
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”