Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 6
Credit for <strong>the</strong> British success in 1944-45 must also be given to a number of key personalities.
Both <strong>the</strong> Supreme Allied Comm<strong>and</strong>er, Mediterranean, General Alex<strong>and</strong>er, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> GOC
in A<strong>the</strong>ns, General Scobie, made some important judgements on <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> conflict
at an early point. 234 Yet, in particular, General Scobie’s insistence on protecting <strong>the</strong> local
populace while dealing decisively with <strong>the</strong> hard-line insurgents proved to be a textbook
piece of counter-insurgency warfare. Few comm<strong>and</strong>ers since have managed to balance
so well <strong>the</strong> classic conundrum of “hearts <strong>and</strong> minds” activity having to sit alongside
attacks. His was <strong>the</strong> original “3 Block War”. 235
His comm<strong>and</strong>er’s intent was always clearly
articulated, simply because he was very concerned about getting this balance absolutely
right. Finally, <strong>the</strong> British effort had <strong>the</strong> benefit of clear political direction <strong>and</strong> support
throughout <strong>the</strong> campaign. Churchill had taken a robust stance from as early as May 1944,
warning of a Communist takeover in Greece <strong>and</strong> calling for <strong>the</strong> diversion of forces from
<strong>the</strong> Italian campaign at <strong>the</strong> point of a German withdrawal from Greece. When General
Scobie asked for reinforcements, Churchill met those requests, <strong>and</strong> when <strong>the</strong> truce was
signed between British forces <strong>and</strong> ELAS in January 1945, Churchill provided guarantees
to Greece in <strong>the</strong> form of a garrison until such time as <strong>the</strong> Greek government felt that
<strong>the</strong> newly created Hellenic armed forces <strong>and</strong> gendarmerie could meet any subsequent
Communist challenge. Clear political direction <strong>and</strong> support throughout a campaign are
vital for victory in any conflict, <strong>and</strong> where <strong>the</strong>y have been lacking in counter-insurgency
scenarios of <strong>the</strong> past, failure has invariably followed. This was certainly true in <strong>the</strong> French
Indochina war <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> American period in Vietnam. In wars of choice, as many counterinsurgency
scenarios have been for <strong>the</strong> west, clear political direction <strong>and</strong> support become
even more important. In <strong>the</strong> absence of that clear direction <strong>and</strong> support, crafting <strong>the</strong>
appropriate strategy or strategies becomes difficult, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> military instrument can
become overly focused on operational <strong>and</strong> tactical level campaign success. In Greece,
during 1944 <strong>and</strong> 1945, <strong>the</strong> political objective was very clear <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> military instrument
crafted <strong>the</strong> appropriate strategy to achieve that objective. That strategy was clearly
articulated to all of General Scobie’s subordinate comm<strong>and</strong>ers, including <strong>the</strong> AOC, <strong>Air</strong>
Commodore Tuttle. In many respects, this campaign has a very modern feel because a
variety of instruments were used to achieve <strong>the</strong> objective <strong>and</strong>, most importantly, all <strong>the</strong>se
instruments worked toge<strong>the</strong>r according to a unified strategic plan.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 113