Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 11
The dem<strong>and</strong>s of unifying <strong>and</strong> focusing <strong>the</strong> efforts of several military services – from
several different countries in <strong>the</strong> case of a coalition – while at <strong>the</strong> same time controlling
<strong>and</strong> co-ordinating <strong>the</strong> efforts of non-military agencies so as to ensure a holistic strategy
<strong>and</strong> policy, dem<strong>and</strong>s that a single individual be in charge. Although this will not ensure
that <strong>the</strong> resulting policy or strategy is <strong>the</strong> correct one – witness <strong>the</strong> events in Iraq during
2003 – such unity of comm<strong>and</strong> is a necessary if insufficient condition for success.
4. Integration. By this I mean <strong>the</strong> co-ordinated use of all instruments/levers of power:
military, political, economic, psychological <strong>and</strong> cultural. As I have tried to stress several
times already, <strong>the</strong> new environment confronting us is marked by asymmetric actors <strong>and</strong>
challenges. Although in <strong>the</strong> old era it was wise to use a combination of <strong>the</strong>se levers of
power, today it is essential, <strong>and</strong>, importantly, <strong>the</strong> actual mix employed is changing.
During <strong>the</strong> last Quadrennial Defense Review, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
pushed a concept of four major challenges to <strong>the</strong> US <strong>and</strong> its interests: traditional (regional
competitors posing conventional threats), disruptive (adversaries negating US advantages
with asymmetrical technology), irregular (terrorist attacks by non-state actors), <strong>and</strong>
catastrophic (a major attack on <strong>the</strong> US involving WMD). 478 It was his belief that <strong>the</strong> threats
facing <strong>the</strong> US were gradually but definitely shifting away from <strong>the</strong> traditional threat –
although it certainly did not disappear – <strong>and</strong> towards <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r three. These “o<strong>the</strong>r three”
required fundamentally different types of forces, doctrines <strong>and</strong> organizations to combat
<strong>the</strong>m effectively. More importantly, <strong>the</strong>se threats required an integrated effort that crossed
cabinet departments <strong>and</strong> agencies. The Department of Defense could not h<strong>and</strong>le <strong>the</strong>se
problems alone, despite a vigorous “can do” spirit.
Despite Rumsfeld having fallen from grace, <strong>the</strong> validity of his view <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> results not
obtained when it is violated, are evident in Iraq. At <strong>the</strong> conclusion of military hostilities in
1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf journeyed to <strong>the</strong> tent at Safwan to negotiate a cease
fire with <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>er of <strong>the</strong> defeated Iraqi forces. Schwarzkopf received virtually no
guidance from <strong>the</strong> US State Department on this critical meeting. Ano<strong>the</strong>r participant,
General Chuck Horner <strong>the</strong> air component comm<strong>and</strong>er, remembers sitting down with <strong>the</strong>
o<strong>the</strong>r senior comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>the</strong> evening before <strong>the</strong> crucial meeting to discuss <strong>the</strong>ir agenda.
They were not prepared. Horner pulled out a blank yellow writing pad <strong>and</strong> after some
initial discussion wrote “prisoners of war” at <strong>the</strong> top. All those present remembered <strong>the</strong>
terrible fate of <strong>the</strong>ir comrades at <strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> North Vietnamese <strong>and</strong> were determined
to receive a full accounting this time. Fur<strong>the</strong>r discussions were equally unfocused <strong>and</strong>
haphazard. 479
War, <strong>and</strong> its aftermath, must be addressed by a coalition of agencies,
not simply <strong>the</strong> military. Today, a concerted effort emphasizing experts <strong>and</strong> expertise
from Defense, State, Treasury, Homel<strong>and</strong> Security, Intelligence, <strong>and</strong> perhaps Non-
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 195