Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 4
population, became enshrined in <strong>the</strong>ory, if not always in practice. The Army was very
clearly <strong>the</strong> predominant branch of <strong>the</strong> armed forces in undertaking counter-insurgency
operations in what has been retrospectively labelled <strong>the</strong> “classical counter-insurgency
era”. 114
What has remained relatively untouched by mainstream counter-insurgency
research is <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong> RAF was forced to acclimatise to both <strong>the</strong> constraints <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s
of asymmetric warfare in a restricted <strong>the</strong>atre of operations.
“Little Evidence of Direct Success”? <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> in Malaya
The British response to <strong>the</strong> 1948-1960 Malayan Emergency is widely considered to be <strong>the</strong>
first modern counter-insurgency <strong>and</strong> is often regarded both by scholars <strong>and</strong> practitioners
alike as archetypically successful. 115 Humiliated by <strong>the</strong>ir defeat at <strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> Japanese
in <strong>the</strong> dense jungle of Malaya during World War II, <strong>the</strong> British attempted unsuccessfully
to reorganise <strong>the</strong> political structure of <strong>the</strong> colony in 1946 with failed plans for a Malayan
Union. In February 1948 a new constitutional arrangement, <strong>the</strong> Federation of Malaya was
inaugurated, which safeguarded <strong>the</strong> position of <strong>the</strong> powerful regional sultans <strong>and</strong> restricted
<strong>the</strong> citizenship rights of non-Malays. This restriction alienated <strong>the</strong> Chinese community not
only from <strong>the</strong>ir Malay neighbours but from <strong>the</strong>ir British rulers. Some sought solace in <strong>the</strong>
doctrine of communism, which after World War II was actively propagated by <strong>the</strong> Soviet
Union throughout Asia. Established in 1930, <strong>the</strong> Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had
endured a short <strong>and</strong> largely unsuccessful infancy in which <strong>the</strong>ir seven thous<strong>and</strong> strong
war-time militant grouping, <strong>the</strong> Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), failed
to hold back <strong>the</strong> invading Imperial army from controlling Malaya. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> MPAJA
was to a large extent funded <strong>and</strong> armed by <strong>the</strong> British in an attempt to hold back <strong>the</strong>
Japanese forces. The equipment provided by <strong>the</strong> British would eventually be used against
<strong>the</strong>m as <strong>the</strong> MCP turned its guerrilla tactics against <strong>the</strong> colonial rulers in 1948. The racial
tension unleashed by <strong>the</strong> Federation Constitution curtailed <strong>the</strong> legitimate options open
to <strong>the</strong> predominantly ethnic Chinese MCP. Of <strong>the</strong> 12,000 members in February 1947 all
but 800 were Chinese. 116
Combined with a crackdown on <strong>the</strong> wider leftist <strong>and</strong> trade
union movement by <strong>the</strong> British authorities, <strong>the</strong> MCP’s recourse to violence hardened. A
violent flurry of attacks in 1948 on white settlers <strong>and</strong> rubber plantations – <strong>the</strong> symbols
of perceived imperial control <strong>and</strong> exploitation – primed <strong>the</strong> conditions for a wider
insurgent uprising. As unrest grew, <strong>the</strong> MCP’s newly formed Malayan Races Liberation
Army (MRLA) resorted to arson directed towards British economic interests <strong>and</strong> political
assassinations. As <strong>the</strong> violence against British <strong>and</strong> settler targets spiralled, <strong>the</strong> colonial
administration was forced to act, <strong>and</strong> on 19 June 1948 <strong>the</strong> High Commissioner, Sir Edward
Gent, declared a Federation-wide State of Emergency in order to quell an insurgency that
<strong>the</strong> military, political <strong>and</strong> intelligence communities had failed to foresee. 117
Not only did <strong>the</strong> military have to deal with an unexpected insurgency, it had to do it
with limited resources. Inevitable post-war cutbacks had severely hampered <strong>the</strong> RAF’s
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 69