Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>’s Role in Asymmetric Operations: The Case of <strong>the</strong> Second Lebanon War
that <strong>the</strong> adversary is operating in a conventional, force-on-force setting with clear centres
of gravity, <strong>and</strong> clearly-marked, organised, <strong>and</strong> identified individuals. Just as ground forces
must change <strong>the</strong>ir strategies <strong>and</strong> tactics when fighting against asymmetric adversaries –
shifting, for example, from conventional, Cold War-style conflict to counter-insurgency
operations – so must air forces. In <strong>the</strong>se settings, air power may find more frequent, visible
utility in its indirect support roles than in <strong>the</strong>se direct combat roles.
The main reason, as <strong>the</strong> preceding analysis shows, is that perhaps <strong>the</strong> greatest advantage
of <strong>the</strong> adversary – in this case Hezbollah – paradoxically may be <strong>the</strong> lack of high-value
assets. In that way, Hezbollah as an adversary was akin to o<strong>the</strong>r terrorist, insurgent groups,
or o<strong>the</strong>rs that employ irregular warfare tactics. Scholars James Corum <strong>and</strong> Wray Johnson
observe: “Generally speaking, guerrillas <strong>and</strong> terrorists rarely present lucrative targets for
aerial attack, <strong>and</strong> even more rarely is <strong>the</strong>re ever a chance for air power to be employed in
a strategic bombing campaign or even in attack operations on any large scale.” 396
While <strong>the</strong> argument may have merit as specified in this way, it may lead to a sense of false
choices between air power on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong> or ground forces on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Reliance on
air power in a classic air campaign is almost certainly misguided for <strong>the</strong> reasons discussed
earlier, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> use of ground forces is almost imperative if <strong>the</strong> goals are to disarm ununiformed
fighters <strong>and</strong> destroy mobile targets, but air power has second order contributions
to make.
First, perhaps <strong>the</strong> most important contribution air power can make in an irregular setting
is through close air support as part of joint air-ground operations. The US use of <strong>the</strong>
A-37 attack aeroplane <strong>and</strong> AC-47 gunship in El Salvador, <strong>the</strong> A-10 in Afghanistan,
<strong>the</strong> Russian SU-25 in Chechnya, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Indian Mi-17 in Kashmir serve as examples
in which air power has operated on behalf of ground forces <strong>and</strong>, where appropriate,
inflicted casualties on <strong>the</strong> assaulting guerrilla forces. Detailed accounts of how F-15Es
<strong>and</strong> AC-130s provided urgent close air support when Army Apaches were unable to
provide sufficient fire power <strong>and</strong> presence add fur<strong>the</strong>r evidence of <strong>the</strong> importance of air
power in a close air support role. 397
Second, some air power advocates have suggested that air dominance may limit <strong>the</strong>
adversary’s options. Unable to compete with a highly advanced air force, insurgents or
terrorists would have to resort to asymmetric tactics. As such, “air power can help bound
a conflict <strong>and</strong> deny <strong>the</strong> enemy some escalation options,” which advocates such as those at
<strong>the</strong> RAND Corporation argue <strong>the</strong> US <strong>and</strong> UK have done in Iraq <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan. Because
of <strong>the</strong> coalition dominance in airborne intelligence, surveillance, <strong>and</strong> reconnaissance,
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”