Air Power, Insurgency and the âWar on Terrorâ - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...
Air Power, Insurgency and the âWar on Terrorâ - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...
Air Power, Insurgency and the âWar on Terrorâ - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...
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Night of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Flying Hooligans<br />
in September 1986. “There are <strong>on</strong>ly two things Afghans must have: <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Koran <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Stinger,” Massoud <strong>on</strong>ce said, but <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> jury is still deliberating <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> level of losses that<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Stinger <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> o<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r MANPADS inflicted <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Soviets <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> DRAAF. However, <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s did cause <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> VVS, AA <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> DRAAF to change some tactics; fighter bombers<br />
flew higher still, helicopters got closer to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> ground <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> close air support burden<br />
was increasingly absorbed by <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> gunners. The Soviets also fitted ASO-2V chaff/flare<br />
dispensers <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> L-166V-1E IR countermeasures to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Hinds which somewhat degraded<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Stingers’ effectiveness. 340<br />
The role of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Stinger has reached almost legendary proporti<strong>on</strong>s with claims that <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
missiles exacted such a high toll <strong>on</strong> Soviet aircraft that it became almost impossible to<br />
provide <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> ground forces with close air support. It is difficult to c<strong>on</strong>firm this lethality.<br />
The nature of Afghan terrain <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> hazards of war hardly made it feasible to c<strong>on</strong>duct a<br />
field study <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> missile’s effectiveness. We will probably never know exactly how many<br />
Soviet <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> DRAAF aircraft <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> missile was resp<strong>on</strong>sible for destroying.<br />
Where <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Mujahideen would excel was in establishing ambushes, opening fire <strong>on</strong> an<br />
aircraft with <strong>on</strong>e, visible weap<strong>on</strong>, causing <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> aircraft to fly away, usually into <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> mouth of<br />
o<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r hidden air defences. 341 Ground ambushes would be mounted <strong>on</strong> Soviet troops <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>ir vehicles, <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> troops would call for air support, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> rebels would open fire with<br />
MANPADS or Anti-<str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g>craft Artillery (AAA) when <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> aircraft arrived. “SAM-bushes” were<br />
ano<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r favourite technique. A MANPADS-armed Mujahideen unit would attack aircraft<br />
taking off <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> l<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>ing at an airbase before making <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>ir fast escape <strong>on</strong> a motorcycle. 342<br />
As Coaliti<strong>on</strong> aircrews are finding in present day Afghanistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iraq, Rocket Propelled<br />
Grenades could also bring down a helicopter.<br />
Losses<br />
In <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> final analysis, <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> total losses from all causes to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> VVS, AA <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> DRAAF have<br />
been reported as up to 2,675 aircraft, o<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r estimates put <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> total losses at 451 VVS <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
AA aircraft <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> an unknown number for <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> DRAAF. After Blowpipe <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Stinger arrived,<br />
reports circulated that up to 450 aircraft per year were claimed by <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> missiles. Almost<br />
certainly an exaggerati<strong>on</strong>, possibly for propag<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>a purposes to inflate <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> success of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
missiles <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> thus secure additi<strong>on</strong>al systems from Washingt<strong>on</strong>. 343 One thing seems certain,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> VVS <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> AA did not lose this war. It was instead lost <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> home fr<strong>on</strong>t as <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> dead<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> wounded returned <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>script soldiers became increasingly demoralised against<br />
a well-motivated oppositi<strong>on</strong> fighting in <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>ir own backyard to eject an unpopular foreign<br />
invader. The Soviet leadership under Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had decided in<br />
1986 to seek a withdrawal from <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> country signing <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Geneva Accords in 1988 with<br />
Afghanistan, Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> US to pave <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> way for <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Soviet withdrawal <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> following<br />
140<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Power</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Insurgency</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> “War <strong>on</strong> Terror”