Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force Operations in South-West Arabia 1917-1967
An even more substantial offensive in <strong>the</strong> Radfan was planned for April 1964; one that
would end rebel activity in <strong>the</strong> area. The attack got off to a poor start when an advance
party from <strong>the</strong> SAS was discovered by <strong>the</strong> rebels <strong>and</strong> needed very close air support
until <strong>the</strong>y could be safely withdrawn. The planned parachute action was cancelled <strong>and</strong>
<strong>the</strong> ground forces advanced using <strong>the</strong> cover of darkness. The fighting, often intensive,
continued for <strong>the</strong> next six weeks, supported by RAF fixed wing <strong>and</strong> helicopters from all
three Services. <strong>Air</strong> control of <strong>the</strong> dissident areas continued after <strong>the</strong> ground fighting had
continued until November when all <strong>the</strong> tribes involved had sued for peace. Radfan was a
military success, but it proved a political failure that presaged eventual withdrawal.
At <strong>the</strong> beginning of 1966 <strong>the</strong> Government issued a White Paper stating its intention to
withdraw British forces from South Arabia in 1968. This marked <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong>
end. Confidence in <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> Federation rapidly fell while <strong>the</strong> security situation
quickly worsened. This included fur<strong>the</strong>r cross-border incursions, involving fighter aircraft
based in Yemen, <strong>and</strong> ever higher levels of terrorism. In <strong>the</strong> event, matters got so bad that
departure was brought forward to November 1967. It is to <strong>the</strong> RAF’s immense credit that
<strong>the</strong> evacuation of families, equipment <strong>and</strong> personnel was completed on time <strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong>
minimum of fuss. Yet it was an unhappy period <strong>and</strong> brought to an end not only 128 years
of British rule but also nearly fifty years of RAF operations at Khormaksar.
Conclusions
Looking back at <strong>the</strong> history of air operations in South-west Arabia, it is clear that air
control, as an instrument of governance, was only effective (<strong>and</strong> only intended) as an
extension of colonial authority. This required <strong>the</strong> indigenous population, or at least its
leaders, to recognise <strong>the</strong> legitimacy of British rule. Critics have made much of <strong>the</strong> failure
of <strong>the</strong> RAF to control Palestine in <strong>the</strong> 1920s, noting that aircraft proved incapable of
pacifying <strong>the</strong> towns <strong>and</strong> cities. This is to miss <strong>the</strong> point: air control could only be effective
if <strong>the</strong>re was a credible basis for governance. Where this existed, <strong>the</strong> RAF was able to
extend <strong>the</strong> authorities’ reach to those areas that were o<strong>the</strong>rwise inaccessible or just too
expensive to garrison. <strong>Air</strong> control created a permissive environment in which political
officers could establish a climate of self-interest, allowing local rulers to benefit from <strong>the</strong>ir
involvement with <strong>the</strong> British <strong>and</strong>, for those who refused to be engaged – or acted in a way
that threatened those that were – to be punished. And, least this be regarded as a careful
euphemism, “punishment” meant <strong>the</strong> destruction of property, whe<strong>the</strong>r it be buildings or
livestock, or <strong>the</strong> disruption of daily life. It rarely involved death or even injury.
<strong>Air</strong> control’s centre of gravity was <strong>the</strong> credibility of <strong>the</strong> colonial power. From <strong>the</strong> beginning
of British rule in Aden <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Protectorates <strong>the</strong> main external threat was Yemen’s claim of
sovereignty over all of sou<strong>the</strong>rn Arabia. As long as this took <strong>the</strong> form of border incursions
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”