Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Starting with a Blank Sheet: Principles of War for a New Century
delivery of <strong>the</strong>se weapons with such accuracy <strong>and</strong> in near-zero visibility conditions was
an incredible psychological blow.
In three weeks Baghdad fell with a blessedly low cost of life: 139 Coalition deaths. Only
two fixed-wing Coalition aircraft were lost to enemy fire. 435 “Shock <strong>and</strong> awe,” as <strong>the</strong> new
operational scheme was dubbed, was amazingly successful.
But <strong>the</strong>n things went horribly awry. A large part of <strong>the</strong> resulting problems were caused by
two decisions that, in retrospect, were terribly ill-advised <strong>and</strong> which are illustrative of <strong>the</strong>
new conflict environment that confronts us. The civilian head of <strong>the</strong> Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), Paul Bremer, issued two edicts. First, on 16 May 2003, he directed a
“de-Baathification program.” All senior Baath Party members, who occupied <strong>the</strong> majority
of key administrative <strong>and</strong> bureaucratic positions in Iraq, were henceforth banned from
holding such positions. 436 A week later he ordered <strong>the</strong> disarmament <strong>and</strong> disb<strong>and</strong>ing of
both <strong>the</strong> Iraqi armed forces <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iraqi National Police Force. The result of <strong>the</strong>se two
edicts was that virtually overnight a power vacuum was created in Iraq, allowing <strong>the</strong>
forces of lawlessness to move in virtually unmolested. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> two edicts
effectively put tens of thous<strong>and</strong>s of highly-trained <strong>and</strong> capable Iraqis out of work, thus
ensuring not only chaos in government services, but also deep enmity for those who
had put <strong>the</strong>se former civil servants into <strong>the</strong> ranks of <strong>the</strong> unemployed. As one member of
Bremer’s staff later commented: “That was <strong>the</strong> week we made 450,000 enemies on <strong>the</strong>
ground in Iraq – <strong>and</strong> over one million more, if one counted <strong>the</strong>ir dependents.” 437
The US military compounded <strong>the</strong>se mistaken policies by inserting large numbers of
conventionally trained <strong>and</strong> equipped ground troops into an explosive situation that
dem<strong>and</strong>ed instead <strong>the</strong> expertise of those schooled in counter-insurgency operations.
It is significant that US Army Field Manual 1 states baldly: “Decisive resolution of conflicts
normally occurs on l<strong>and</strong>. Of <strong>the</strong> Armed Forces’ capabilities, l<strong>and</strong> power is unique because
only l<strong>and</strong> forces can occupy, control, <strong>and</strong> protect vital areas. People <strong>and</strong> resources – <strong>the</strong>
participants, supporters, <strong>and</strong> objectives of l<strong>and</strong> operations – can only be controlled or
protected by l<strong>and</strong> forces.” 438
Yet few plans were made to conduct this “unique” mission.
Observers have noted that US Central Comm<strong>and</strong> had virtually no plans for <strong>the</strong> occupation
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 439 This is <strong>the</strong> more surprising because a disturbing
study done by <strong>the</strong> US Army’s Strategic Studies Institute reveals a peculiar spin that ground
comm<strong>and</strong>ers put on planning for this crucial post-conflict phase: 440
In Iraq, <strong>the</strong> US leadership did not seem to expect protracted irregular
warfare beyond <strong>the</strong> termination of major combat operations. As
liberator of all Iraqis from a brutal tyranny, US forces, it was widely
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”