Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

“Looks Suspicious”: The US Marines <strong>Air</strong> Campaign against <strong>the</strong> S<strong>and</strong>ino Insurgents of Nicaragua 1927-1933
The following are some of <strong>the</strong> signs that are depended upon: Hostile
fire, visible arms, number of persons present compared to normal
population, proportion of men to women, number of horses <strong>and</strong>
pack animals present, number of cattle seen, actions of individuals
in presence of aeroplanes, amount of washing observed in area,
occasionally earth works for defense or prepared ambushes are
found, condition of trails, general appearance of villages <strong>and</strong> farms,
actions of people known to be innocent, ground intelligence reports,
character of citizens in <strong>the</strong> area, etc., etc. 180
A number of historians have read <strong>the</strong>se orders <strong>and</strong> assumed, <strong>the</strong>refore, that <strong>the</strong>se humane
<strong>and</strong> restrained policies were actually followed. For example, Wray Johnson’s recent article,
“<strong>Air</strong>power <strong>and</strong> Restraint in Small Wars,” emphasised that <strong>the</strong> Marine aviators showed
considerable constraint. However, while <strong>the</strong> rules of engagement might appear to
guarantee a limited war, <strong>the</strong>ir effects were just <strong>the</strong> opposite. The reality on <strong>the</strong> ground did
not match <strong>the</strong> orders.
Without any formal military training, S<strong>and</strong>ino created a classic guerrilla army. The
S<strong>and</strong>inista soldiers had no uniforms <strong>and</strong> generally were indistinguishable from <strong>the</strong> civilian
population from which <strong>the</strong>y emanated. Most of <strong>the</strong> male peasants carried machetes <strong>and</strong>
many also had pistols <strong>and</strong> shotguns for protection <strong>and</strong> hunting. Even seeing someone
armed did not mean that he was a S<strong>and</strong>inista soldier. Thus, <strong>the</strong> emblematic dilemma of
fighting an insurgency: how to know exactly who your enemy is. The Marines remained
vexed by this problem through <strong>the</strong> entire war.
Since <strong>the</strong>y could not differentiate civilians from combatants, <strong>the</strong> target of <strong>the</strong> Marines
became almost <strong>the</strong> entire population of <strong>the</strong> Segovias. By <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> war, most of
<strong>the</strong> peasants were indeed S<strong>and</strong>inista supporters <strong>and</strong> collaborators. Colonel Robert Denig
gave an accurate description of <strong>the</strong> support that existed for S<strong>and</strong>ino in <strong>the</strong> countryside,
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>the</strong> Marines faced:
The natives living in <strong>the</strong> hills throughout this area are actively
engaged in b<strong>and</strong>itry, but, unless actually killed or captured in a
combat, proof of this is very difficult. These natives join with various
Jefes for an ambush or attack some town, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n after <strong>the</strong> combat,
conceal <strong>the</strong>ir arms <strong>and</strong> go to <strong>the</strong>ir huts, where, to all intent <strong>and</strong>
purposes, <strong>the</strong>y are peacefully farming. These scattered farms furnish
<strong>the</strong> main source of food supply to b<strong>and</strong>it groups, <strong>and</strong> even though
proof of <strong>the</strong>ir having supplied b<strong>and</strong>its with food <strong>and</strong> shelter is at
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”