Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 13
American society that make technology <strong>the</strong> preferred tool, instead of humans. He labels
this “<strong>the</strong> instrumental dimension of war” <strong>and</strong> asserts that technology offers a chance
to reduce <strong>the</strong> cruelty of war. 525 The development of technology in air power <strong>and</strong> its
“successful” application in <strong>the</strong> wars since <strong>the</strong> Gulf War of 1991 have created an image of
air power as a nearly risk-free tool. The west seems to be fascinated with air power <strong>and</strong>
its minimum risk to its own pilots <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> non-combatants in <strong>the</strong>atre. 526 Politicians <strong>and</strong>
public opinion in <strong>the</strong> west seem to be convinced that air power is less “messy” than <strong>the</strong>
use of ground forces. 527 Colin McInnes underlines this perception of air power: “Indeed,
it has almost become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with air forces proclaiming <strong>the</strong>ir ability
to strike with precision, fuelling expectations of near-bloodless campaigns where enemy
civilians are successfully avoided <strong>and</strong> only <strong>the</strong> regime is targeted”. 528 Such a perception
of air power has greatly contributed to lowering <strong>the</strong> threshold for using force among
western politicians. A paradox is that this perception of air power has had an unanticipated
effect. 529 More “humane” air power has contributed to <strong>the</strong> use of more force.
This is perhaps <strong>the</strong> “nice version” of <strong>the</strong> story. A more controversial one is to say that this
technology has been developed in order to preserve its own legitimacy. 530 This approach is
ethically much more problematic. Is <strong>the</strong> west developing sophisticated weapons in order
to make <strong>the</strong>ir employment more acceptable so that one can continue to wage wars? One
current example comes from Afghanistan, where NATO wants to reduce <strong>the</strong> explosive
force of bombs in order to limit <strong>and</strong> avoid collateral damage. 531 Can this be viewed as
an example of trying to make ourselves still relevant in a situation that perhaps calls for
means o<strong>the</strong>r than air power?
The idea that air power <strong>and</strong> precision have lowered <strong>the</strong> threshold for <strong>the</strong> use of force is
ethically problematic. The ethical challenge is that <strong>the</strong> effects of air power tend to increase
violence ra<strong>the</strong>r than reduce it. Michael Ignatieff highlights my point by stating: “The
accuracy of new airborne weapons systems lowered – or appeared to lower – <strong>the</strong> political
costs of using <strong>the</strong>m. Clinton went to war, believing that new technology would bring
speedy, risk-free victory” .532
The ethical challenge is even greater if air power <strong>and</strong> precision have been developed to
promote air power as <strong>the</strong> weapon of choice. Is one of <strong>the</strong> aspects more acceptable than
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, or do we have to consider <strong>the</strong>m both as ethically problematic?
Targeting
In its short history, air power has shown its value on <strong>the</strong> conventional <strong>and</strong> classical
battlefield, against military opponents with a clear distinction between friend <strong>and</strong> foe <strong>and</strong>
a terrain that exposes ground troops ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>n conceals <strong>the</strong>m. 533 It seems that when a
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