Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Notes <strong>and</strong> Sources
440. Jeffrey Record <strong>and</strong> W Andrew Terrill, “Iraq <strong>and</strong> Vietnam: Differences, Similarities,
<strong>and</strong> Insights,” US Army Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, 1 May 2004, p. 23.
441. Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin,
2006), pp. 158-65.
442. Bremer states that he cleared this decision through Rumsfeld <strong>and</strong> “discussed” it
with “<strong>the</strong> appropriate Coalition military comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> civilians, including
McKiernan in Baghdad <strong>and</strong> CENTCOM forward headquarters in Qatar.” He
gives no indication that any of <strong>the</strong> ground comm<strong>and</strong>ers on <strong>the</strong> scene disagreed
with his decision. (US Army Lieutenant General David McKiernan was <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>
component comm<strong>and</strong>er at <strong>the</strong> time.) Later, Bremer would continue to maintain
that this was one of his best decisions. Bremer, pp. 57-58. The chairman of <strong>the</strong>
Joints Chiefs of Staff, General Dick Myers, said he was not consulted on <strong>the</strong>
decision. Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2006), p. 198.
443. Ricks, p. 144.
444. Evan Thomas <strong>and</strong> John Barry, “Anatomy of a Revolt,” Newsweek, 24 April 2006,
pp. 28-32; Michael Duffy, “The Revolt of <strong>the</strong> Generals,” Time, 24 April 2006,
pp. 41-42. An exception was retired General Anthony Zinni, Franks’s predecessor
at USCENTCOM, who opposed <strong>the</strong> war from <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>and</strong> said so openly.
For a perplexing article that attempts to portray <strong>the</strong>se failed comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> staff
officers as tragic heroes, see “The Night of <strong>the</strong> Generals,” Vanity Fair, April 2007,
pp. 247-51, 274-80.
445. Ricks, p. 150. A bit disturbingly, <strong>the</strong> only building that US troops were ordered
to protect was <strong>the</strong> Oil Ministry, leading some Iraqis to believe <strong>the</strong> war was not
about liberation but about “stealing <strong>the</strong>ir oil.” Bremer, p. 19. It appears that <strong>the</strong>
decision not to stop <strong>the</strong> looting was made by retired US Army Lieutenant General
Jay Garner, Bremer’s predecessor in Baghdad.
446. Ricks, pp. 198-200.
447. Ibid., p. 139.
448. Ricks, pp. 133, 267.
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 291