Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 5
“Looks Suspicious”: The US Marines <strong>Air</strong> Campaign against
<strong>the</strong> S<strong>and</strong>ino Insurgents of Nicaragua 1927-1933
Richard Grossman
Almost immediately after its invention, warfighters began using <strong>the</strong> aeroplane for
military purposes. Within a decade <strong>the</strong> French were using <strong>the</strong> aeroplane against
insurgents in North Africa. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) also saw
<strong>the</strong> aeroplane as a useful tool in its various Caribbean interventions in <strong>the</strong> second decade
of <strong>the</strong> twentieth century. In <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan campaign against <strong>the</strong> insurgency lead by
Augusto S<strong>and</strong>ino, Marine aviation became an integral component of US “small war,”
or counter-insurgency, strategy. Major Ross E Rowell, <strong>the</strong> Marine aviation comm<strong>and</strong>er
in Nicaragua during 1927 <strong>and</strong> 1928, claimed that aircraft had rendered services to <strong>the</strong>
campaign of “a relative importance unprecedented in military operations.” 155 New tactics
<strong>and</strong> techniques were developed <strong>and</strong> refined. The Marines aviators were getting so much
experience that <strong>the</strong> Army <strong>Air</strong> Corps actually requested a chance to participate for training
purposes. 156
Since <strong>the</strong> 1920s, numerous military authors have praised this campaign. The experiences
learned in Nicaragua became <strong>the</strong> model for much of <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ Small War Manual.
In Soldiers of <strong>the</strong> Sea, an official history of <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps written in <strong>the</strong> 1960s, Colonel
Robert Heinl claimed that <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan campaign was “<strong>the</strong> first air-ground war in
history.” 157 In a recent article, Dr Wray Johnson called Nicaragua <strong>the</strong> “model for air power
in small wars.” 158
Despite this glowing praise, <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan campaign must be seen as a failed counterinsurgency
<strong>and</strong> that Marine aviation contributed to this failure. When <strong>the</strong> war finally
ended in 1933, S<strong>and</strong>ino had not been defeated but instead was at <strong>the</strong> height of his
military <strong>and</strong> political power. A ceasefire was signed after S<strong>and</strong>ino had achieved his prime
objective: <strong>the</strong> withdrawal of all US military forces from Nicaragua. Many in Nicaragua,
even beyond his base area of support in <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn region known as <strong>the</strong> Segovias, now
considered him a national hero.
Since <strong>the</strong> Marines won almost every battle, it is worth asking why <strong>the</strong> campaign was
a failure. The fundamental shortcoming was not military, but political. Success in an
insurgency depends on winning <strong>the</strong> so-called “hearts <strong>and</strong> minds” of <strong>the</strong> civilian population.
By <strong>the</strong> early 1920s, after <strong>the</strong> earlier small wars in Haiti <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic, some
Marine strategists were beginning to realise <strong>the</strong> importance of winning civilian support.
For example, in a 1921 article in Marine Corps Gazette, Lieutenant Colonel E H Ellis noted:
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 83