Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 11
in 1999, or so he was told by his political masters. 432 Ominously, <strong>the</strong> mounting US death
toll in Iraq corresponds to <strong>the</strong> fall in popular support among <strong>the</strong> American people. 433 As
for collateral damage, <strong>the</strong> news media <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mobile satellite uplinks are ever present
where our forces fight, <strong>and</strong> that media will highlight every bomb or artillery shell that falls
short <strong>and</strong> every rifle bullet that kills an innocent byst<strong>and</strong>er; to say nothing of blunders like
Abu Ghraib <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Haditha massacre. Such events can seriously undermine US foreign
policy; hence, <strong>the</strong> extreme emphasis now placed on limiting collateral damage in all of
our military operations. PGMs are essential in <strong>the</strong> conduct of US military operations, even
though such expensive weapons are not required by international law. The US is now
expected to use <strong>the</strong>m.
Conflicts following Desert Storm buttressed claims that a new paradigm of war was
emerging. In Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn Iraq in 2003, diplomatic
constraints helped to shape a series of operations that proved unusually successful to
both sides by providing politically desirable results with a remarkably low casualty toll.
These notable campaigns were alike in that <strong>the</strong>y relied primarily on air power – both
l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> sea-based – combined with special operations forces (SOF), indigenous ground
troops such as <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Alliance in Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kurds in nor<strong>the</strong>rn Iraq, <strong>and</strong>
robust intelligence <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control (C2) systems that were linked toge<strong>the</strong>r in
a global array.
So what has gone wrong in Iraq? Certainly it was not <strong>the</strong> initial operations to overthrow
<strong>the</strong> Saddam regime that were found wanting. Despite arguments from some ground
generals <strong>and</strong> ill-informed pundits that <strong>the</strong> number of US conventional ground troops to
be used in <strong>the</strong> invasion was too small – barely one-quarter <strong>the</strong> total used in 1991 – <strong>the</strong>
results achieved were astounding. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> invasion force of General Tommy Franks
was decreased even fur<strong>the</strong>r than intended due to <strong>the</strong> refusal by Turkey to allow Coalition
troops to use its territory. As a consequence, <strong>the</strong> new paradigm remained largely intact
in nor<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>and</strong> western Iraq where few conventional US troops were present. Even <strong>the</strong>
contingent coming up from Kuwait was relatively small. The decisive force remained air
power, <strong>and</strong> it possessed even greater precision, stealth (<strong>the</strong> addition of <strong>the</strong> B-2 bomber)
<strong>and</strong> enhanced space <strong>and</strong> air-based reconnaissance assets <strong>and</strong> C2 systems than in 1991.
One of <strong>the</strong> compelling illustrations of how <strong>the</strong>se new technologies have revolutionised
war was <strong>the</strong> s<strong>and</strong>storm that essentially halted Coalition forces in <strong>the</strong> drive for Baghdad
in March 2003. These conditions in times past would have kept air power grounded <strong>and</strong>
ineffective. This time, however, Joint STARS <strong>and</strong> Global Hawk sensor aircraft flying above
<strong>the</strong> storms could penetrate <strong>the</strong> s<strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong>ir radar sensors <strong>and</strong> pinpoint Iraqi targets,
which were <strong>the</strong>n struck by GPS-guided weapons. 434 To <strong>the</strong> stunned Iraqis below, <strong>the</strong>
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 181