Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 11
comm<strong>and</strong>s established within a <strong>the</strong>atre, each with <strong>the</strong>ir own, nominally joint, planning
<strong>and</strong> operations staffs. These separate staffs, overseen by <strong>the</strong> combatant comm<strong>and</strong>er, are
expected to co-ordinate with each o<strong>the</strong>r. 484 There is also <strong>the</strong> combatant comm<strong>and</strong>er’s staff,
but this is largely a peacetime organization that develops contingency plans: when a crisis
breaks out, <strong>the</strong>se staffs remain behind to become largely administrative units while <strong>the</strong>
functional component staffs deploy forward. I envision <strong>the</strong> new joint task forces becoming
<strong>the</strong> nucleus for <strong>the</strong>atre battle staffs: fully joint <strong>and</strong> fully integrated, working directly for <strong>the</strong>
combatant comm<strong>and</strong>ers that will eventually replace <strong>the</strong> component staffs.
6. Intelligence: On <strong>the</strong> face of it, this maxim seems to apply most specifically towards <strong>the</strong>
employment of air <strong>and</strong> space power. I have written elsewhere that intelligence is <strong>the</strong> key
to air power, <strong>and</strong> by that I meant that <strong>the</strong> nature of global strike capability means that all
aspects of an enemy nation are vulnerable to attack. 485 In <strong>the</strong> era before air power, that
was not generally <strong>the</strong> case: <strong>the</strong> vital centres of a nation were defended <strong>and</strong> protected by
armies, fortresses <strong>and</strong> sheer geography. If <strong>the</strong> French wished to strike Berlin, for example,
<strong>the</strong>y had to first get close enough to do so, <strong>and</strong> that might take years <strong>and</strong> countless lives.
<strong>Air</strong> power changed all of that. At <strong>the</strong> same time, however, just because all targets might
now be vulnerable did not mean all were of equal value or promised <strong>the</strong> same return if
neutralised. Intelligence, <strong>and</strong> intelligence of a new type that focused on economic <strong>and</strong>
industrial data, was needed to most effectively <strong>and</strong> efficiently target an enemy’s vital
centres.
Today, <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> for intelligence is even greater while at <strong>the</strong> same time more
difficult to obtain. As our intelligence-ga<strong>the</strong>ring sensors <strong>and</strong> techniques have
become better, so too have adversaries learned new tricks at hiding, camouflaging
or distorting <strong>the</strong> objects we try to examine. At times, this can lead to disaster, as with
“The Case of <strong>the</strong> Missing WMD” in Iraq. This means that once again <strong>the</strong> type of intelligence
has metamorphosed. Just as air power dem<strong>and</strong>ed a new type of economic intelligence,
so now does <strong>the</strong> asymmetrical warfare of insurgency <strong>and</strong> terrorism require cultural
intelligence that our present system is not equipped to collect. We simply do not know or
underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> motivations of many of those who now seek to destroy us. The psyche of
al Qaeda leaders still mystifies us.
In addition, although we now have sensors – based in space, in <strong>the</strong> air, on l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> at
sea – that can detect objects, both moving <strong>and</strong> stationary, as well as intercept all types of
electronic emissions, <strong>the</strong>re are certain targets that still confound us. We need to detect <strong>the</strong>
presence of all types of WMD: where <strong>the</strong>y are made, stored <strong>and</strong> transported. Until we can
do so, accurately <strong>and</strong> continuously, we will be unable to hold at risk <strong>the</strong> activities of rogue
states like North Korea or Iran who defy international sanctions <strong>and</strong> continue to pursue
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 197