Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 14
Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>Air</strong> Force played a substantial role in Operation Allied Force <strong>and</strong> provided,
according to Dutch sources, approximately 7.5 percent of <strong>the</strong> offensive NATO sorties. 663
Overall, it released slightly more precision guided munitions than <strong>the</strong> Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force. 664
On top of this, a Dutch F-16 downed one of three Serb MiG-29s taken out by allied
aircraft during <strong>the</strong> first night of <strong>the</strong> operation. Indicating <strong>the</strong> sensitivity of this incidence,
<strong>the</strong> Dutch Chief of Defence, Admiral Luuk Kroon, expressed concern to General Wesley
Clark about too much publicity .665
The Royal Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>Air</strong> Force’s performance over <strong>the</strong> Balkans in <strong>the</strong> 1990s was indeed
appreciated by <strong>the</strong> Allies. When General Charles A Horner was asked by a Norwegian
air power expert to comment upon <strong>the</strong> Royal Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>Air</strong> Force, he highlighted
outst<strong>and</strong>ing qualities including professionalism, equipment, training <strong>and</strong> attitude.
Moreover, he took <strong>the</strong> view that in <strong>the</strong> course of Allied Force, <strong>the</strong> Royal Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s
<strong>Air</strong> Force proved to be highly interoperable <strong>and</strong> able to cover a broad panoply of air
power missions, including offensive air combat missions. As such, <strong>the</strong> air component
comm<strong>and</strong>er could rely upon <strong>the</strong> Royal Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>Air</strong> Force to execute difficult missions,
with o<strong>the</strong>r NATO allies being relegated to more supporting roles due to deficiencies in
equipment, training or attitude. 666 <strong>Air</strong> operations over <strong>the</strong> Balkans in <strong>the</strong> 1990s were key
to shape <strong>the</strong> Dutch approach to air power. This experience put <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>Air</strong> Force
into an excellent position to take on a lead role in establishing a European F-16 wing <strong>and</strong>
to contribute to operations over Afghanistan.
As implied in Horner’s statement, sound doctrinal concepts do not have an effect without
<strong>the</strong> political will to use military force. The Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s are indeed ready to commit <strong>the</strong>ir
armed forces across <strong>the</strong> entire spectrum of force, initial phases of an operation included.
Experience gained in <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s taught <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s government that all deployed
units must have sufficient escalation potential. This also applies to operations at <strong>the</strong> lower
end of <strong>the</strong> spectrum of force. 667 In early 2004, <strong>the</strong> Dutch Defence Minister emphasised
that allied solidarity must not only be apparent from a country’s military capabilities, but
also from its willingness to share risks. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> ability to conduct war <strong>and</strong> to make
a contribution of political as well as of military significance has become an important
pillar of Dutch foreign <strong>and</strong> security policy. 668 Although <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s defence budget is
below NATO average, from a Dutch perspective <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> scope of <strong>the</strong> defence
effort cannot be measured in purely financial terms. The military contribution <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>
willingness to actively deploy forces across <strong>the</strong> full spectrum of force are considered of
equal importance. 669
European <strong>Air</strong>lift Co-operation
When in late 2002 <strong>the</strong> European F-16 contingent replaced <strong>the</strong> French Mirage 2000 D
detachment that had participated in <strong>the</strong> early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, <strong>the</strong>
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 253