Air Power, Insurgency and the âWar on Terrorâ - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...
Air Power, Insurgency and the âWar on Terrorâ - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...
Air Power, Insurgency and the âWar on Terrorâ - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...
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“Looks Suspicious”: The US Marines <str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g> Campaign against <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> S<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>ino Insurgents of Nicaragua 1927-1933<br />
both Marine ground <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> air forces c<strong>on</strong>centrated to attack S<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>ino’s headquarters <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
top of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> isolated mountain known as El Chipote. After a vigorous bombing campaign,<br />
S<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>ino ab<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><strong>on</strong>ed this base before <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> final Marine assault. Later in 1930, Marine<br />
aviati<strong>on</strong> attacked ano<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r suspected S<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>inista camp <strong>on</strong> Yuca Puca mountain. One<br />
report described <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> effects of this bombing campaign: “All patches of wooded l<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> was<br />
raked with fire from <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> ship’s guns <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> bombs dropped until <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> mountain top took <strong>on</strong><br />
appearance of a field in Fl<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>ers”. 171<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g> power occasi<strong>on</strong>ally supported ground patrols under attack. Even with <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> limited<br />
communicati<strong>on</strong>, patrols could signal <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>y were under fire <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> point to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> positi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
enemy. Several times planes rescued <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> ground patrols from perilous situati<strong>on</strong>s. Major<br />
Rowell described <strong>on</strong>e of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>se incidents near <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> beginning of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> war. He stated that a<br />
ground patrol was surrounded <strong>on</strong> an isolated jungle hill. The pilot dropped a message<br />
asking where <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> enemy was <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> ground patrol signalled “north, south, east <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
west”. The pilots <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>n asked “how far” <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> patrol was able to give <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> estimated<br />
range. The aeroplanes <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>n bombed <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> indicated area <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> patrol was able to escape.<br />
After this incidence <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Marines developed for <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> first time a “prescribed” system of<br />
bombing directed by ground panels. Rowell later called this incidence “a ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r interesting<br />
occurrence,” since it would never “occur to <strong>on</strong>e that such a situati<strong>on</strong> would ever arise.” 172<br />
Ano<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r example occurred in <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> small town of Quilali. The ground Marines were<br />
surrounded <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> had taken casualties. Under fire, aircraft were able to l<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> airlift out<br />
eighteen of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> most seriously wounded. The aeroplanes <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>n accompanied <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> column<br />
until <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>y were able to reach safety.<br />
We marched <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>m under c<strong>on</strong>tinuous air escort throughout <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> flying<br />
hours of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> day, <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>n we halted <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>m for <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> night <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> repeated<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> process <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> next day. We marched <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>m for two days. As so<strong>on</strong> as<br />
<strong>on</strong>e patrol had reached <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> limit of its fuel, it would be replaced by<br />
ano<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r patrol, so <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>re was c<strong>on</strong>tinuous support. We drove off three<br />
or four ambushed during <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> march. 173<br />
The most comm<strong>on</strong> form of combat were <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> attacks made <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> small villages, isolated<br />
houses <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> individuals which were scattered throughout <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> Segovias. These were not in<br />
support of ground patrols. Using <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> daily “<str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g> Service Reports,” which were written after<br />
each patrol, <strong>on</strong>e can see how frequent <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>se were. Ten separate incidents were noted in<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> m<strong>on</strong>th of April 1928 al<strong>on</strong>e. Murra was a typical Segovian town with a populati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
about 200 <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> about fifty houses. 174 It was attacked several times during this period. One<br />
example is from 12 April 1928 in which <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> report described <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> regular patrol activities<br />
88<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Power</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Insurgency</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> “War <strong>on</strong> Terror”