Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> Ethics in <strong>the</strong> Age of <strong>the</strong> Global Salafi Jihad
“corollary effect” of <strong>the</strong>se raids, namely <strong>the</strong> morale of <strong>the</strong> German people, gradually came
to <strong>the</strong> fore. The situation was crystallised into Anglo-American policy at <strong>the</strong> Casablanca
conference in January 1943 resulting in a directive which called for:
<strong>the</strong> destruction <strong>and</strong> dislocation of <strong>the</strong> German military, industrial
<strong>and</strong> economic system, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> undermining of <strong>the</strong> morale of <strong>the</strong>
German people to <strong>the</strong> point where <strong>the</strong>ir capability for armed
resistance is fatally weakened. 412
This directive acknowledged formally <strong>the</strong> de facto policy, in <strong>the</strong> UK at least, of directly
targeting German civilians. The British, <strong>and</strong> subsequently <strong>the</strong> Americans, demonstrated
ethical elasticity; stretched or contracted by claims of necessity. The culmination was an
“Area Bombing” policy resulting in Hamburg, Dresden <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r attacks designed to
destroy entire population centres.
America’s Perspective
An interesting perspective can be gained by considering <strong>the</strong> US <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Church’s view of
<strong>the</strong> British strategy. At <strong>the</strong> start of <strong>the</strong> War, US Army <strong>Air</strong> Forces were generally critical of
<strong>the</strong> lack of ethical soundness of RAF raids on German towns at night. They preferred to
employ daytime precision bombing against military targets. The US had aircraft capable
of higher altitude flight <strong>and</strong> self defence <strong>and</strong> so were able to fly in daylight without too
many losses. Also, precision was a relative term. In some cases inaccuracies of up to
two miles were possible with <strong>the</strong> sights, bombs <strong>and</strong> crew capabilities available to <strong>the</strong>
US. Never<strong>the</strong>less, US air comm<strong>and</strong>ers (Generals Spaatz, Arnold <strong>and</strong> Eaker) to varying
degrees, actively resisted British attempts at <strong>the</strong> Casablanca Conference to get <strong>the</strong> US
to adopt a similar strategy. This was because <strong>the</strong>y saw <strong>the</strong> British approach, according to
some US military historians, as terrorism.
The Casablanca Conference marked an eventual <strong>and</strong> partial relenting by <strong>the</strong> US. They
did not join <strong>the</strong> UK in night-time bombing but agreed to co-ordinate with <strong>the</strong>m on
<strong>the</strong> round-<strong>the</strong>-clock <strong>and</strong> daytime bombing sorties against population centres. General
Arnold assuaged ethical concerns by saying:
The way to stop <strong>the</strong> killing of civilians is to cause so much damage
<strong>and</strong> destruction <strong>and</strong> death that <strong>the</strong> civilians will dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
government cease fighting. 413
Dresden is <strong>the</strong> most infamous example. The RAF dropped incendiary <strong>and</strong> high explosive
bombs using Bomber Harris’s “double-blow” tactic. That tactic was designed to catch <strong>the</strong>
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”