Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Starting with a Blank Sheet: Principles of War for a New Century
Governmental Agencies, will be needed to confront successfully <strong>the</strong> varied challenges
now facing us.
5. Jointness. For centuries, <strong>the</strong> need for co-operation between <strong>the</strong> services was usually
considered a sometimes desirable but seldom necessary occurrence. An exception
was often seen in Engl<strong>and</strong> where <strong>the</strong> British Way of War, as characterised by Basil H.
Liddell Hart, was an indirect approach that relied on what could be termed peripheral
operations. 480
When <strong>the</strong> enemy – usually France – was too strong to confront head on,
amphibious operations in a different <strong>the</strong>atre – North America, <strong>the</strong> Middle East, Iberia–
were conducted instead. In Lord Grey’s lovely phrase: <strong>the</strong> British Army was to be a
projectile fired by <strong>the</strong> Royal Navy. 481
In <strong>the</strong> US, such co-operation was less evident. An Army-Navy Board existed for a century
or so that was designed to co-ordinate <strong>the</strong> efforts of soldiers <strong>and</strong> sailors, but <strong>the</strong> two
seldom had to actually work toge<strong>the</strong>r. That changed during World War II for two major
reasons. First, global war against major powers dem<strong>and</strong>ed close co-operation to achieve
victory. Second, air power introduced a new dimension to war that also now required close
co-operation between <strong>the</strong> army <strong>and</strong> navy. When <strong>the</strong> mediums of <strong>the</strong> sea <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong> were so
clearly demarcated, sailors <strong>and</strong> soldiers could often ignore each o<strong>the</strong>r with few ill effects.
When air power spanned both domains, arguments regarding priorities, targets, comm<strong>and</strong>
<strong>and</strong> control, <strong>and</strong> allocation of resources had to be solved using a joint approach. 482
Even so, <strong>the</strong> services resisted. A main problem leading to defeat in Vietnam was <strong>the</strong>
parochialism <strong>and</strong> sometimes childish rivalry that existed among <strong>the</strong> services, especially
between <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Force <strong>and</strong> Navy, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army <strong>and</strong> Marines. It was only fur<strong>the</strong>r difficulties
in war – fortunately of a relatively minor nature: in <strong>the</strong> botched Iranian hostage rescue
<strong>and</strong> in Grenada – that forced reform. The result was <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>mark Goldwater-Nichols
legislation of 1986. 483 The move towards jointness occurred in Britain a bit earlier due
largely to fiscal constraints.
Today it is difficult to see what <strong>the</strong> problem was all those years. Jointness works. Period.
The question is, where do we go from here? In my view, jointness today tends to occur at
<strong>the</strong> operational level of war; at <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>atre. This is good, but more can be done. Is it time
for jointness to move both up <strong>and</strong> down? The only joint tactical units in <strong>the</strong> US are in
Special Operations Comm<strong>and</strong>. It is time that instead of air bases, naval ports <strong>and</strong> army
forts, we have Joint Bases where all of <strong>the</strong> services live, train <strong>and</strong> work toge<strong>the</strong>r so that
<strong>the</strong> first time a soldier meets an airman is not in combat overseas. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong>
US is now experimenting with St<strong>and</strong>ing Joint Task Forces that could move <strong>the</strong> concept
of jointness upwards a notch. Today, for example, we have air, l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> sea component
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”