Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Night of <strong>the</strong> Flying Hooligans
Training
If <strong>the</strong> Mujahideen were quick learners so were Soviet aircrews, but often in violation of
Soviet doctrine which, broadly speaking, discouraged individual initiative <strong>and</strong> focused on
strict control of air assets from <strong>the</strong> ground. It is not clear whe<strong>the</strong>r such close control of Soviet
aircraft was performed during <strong>the</strong> Afghan war, but it is possible as anecdotal evidence reports
of Soviet fighter bomber crews ignoring lucrative <strong>and</strong> obvious targets of opportunity on <strong>the</strong>ir
way to pre-planned strikes. That said, air crews did adapt as <strong>the</strong>y gained experience. This
was just as well as <strong>the</strong>ir training was said to be left wanting prior to <strong>the</strong> aircrews experiencing
combat. One pilot noted that: “in normal training we are used to acting shablomo (by
textbook) … when <strong>the</strong> situation becomes complicated as in battle, we are not able to cope
with <strong>the</strong> task before us. That is <strong>the</strong> cost of oversimplification <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> lack of initiative.” 329
An anonymous poll was performed on Soviet aircrew operating in Afghanistan between
1987 <strong>and</strong> 1989. The results were startling: 98 percent of fighter-bomber <strong>and</strong> 50 percent
of bomber pilots returning from service said that <strong>the</strong>y were dissatisfied with <strong>the</strong> training
that <strong>the</strong>y had received prior to going south. 330 Figures are unavailable for helicopter or
transport pilots, although <strong>the</strong> former were noteworthy in adapting to <strong>the</strong>ir environment.
For <strong>the</strong> helicopter crews, mission planning presented its own challenges as time pressure
often caused <strong>the</strong> crews to be committed to battle before this was complete. Having to
“play things by ear” in Afghanistan’s broken <strong>and</strong> unforgiving l<strong>and</strong>scape became <strong>the</strong> order
of <strong>the</strong> day. 331
Comm<strong>and</strong>, control <strong>and</strong> basing
Military operations in Afghanistan were parcelled into four distinct areas: <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn
region included Kunduz, Faizabad, Puli-Kumri, <strong>and</strong> Mazir-i-Sharif; <strong>the</strong> eastern region
encompassed Khost, Asadabad, Jalalabad, Gardez <strong>and</strong> Kabul; while <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>and</strong>
western regions included K<strong>and</strong>ahar <strong>and</strong> Lashkargah, along with Farah, Shind<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>
Herat respectively. 332 All operations were performed under <strong>the</strong> auspices of <strong>the</strong> 40th <strong>Air</strong>
Army, headquartered at Termez, under <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> of <strong>the</strong> 40th Army.
The main air force logistics <strong>and</strong> maintenance facilities were based at Termez. 333 The Soviets
did take time <strong>and</strong> effort to construct <strong>and</strong> upgrade several Afghan airfields <strong>and</strong> airports,
notably Bagram which had originally been constructed as a refuelling <strong>and</strong> dispersal base
for Soviet nuclear-armed bombers to perform attacks on US <strong>and</strong> Allied shipping <strong>and</strong>
targets in <strong>the</strong> Indian Ocean <strong>and</strong> Persian Gulf maritime <strong>and</strong> littoral areas. In addition
Kabul, Shind<strong>and</strong>, K<strong>and</strong>ahar, Farah, Jalalabad <strong>and</strong> Mazir-i-Sharif all received extensions
<strong>and</strong> improvements to facilities, runways <strong>and</strong> infrastructure. That said, deep maintenance
of aircraft was performed back in <strong>the</strong> USSR because <strong>the</strong> Afghan operating bases were
vulnerable to attack from Mujahideen machineguns, mortars <strong>and</strong> artillery. 334
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”