Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>’s Role in Asymmetric Operations: The Case of <strong>the</strong> Second Lebanon War
– primarily in terms of casualties – way to defeat <strong>the</strong> adversary. Israel maintained that
it could use st<strong>and</strong>-off weaponry <strong>and</strong> inflict a sufficient amount of pain on <strong>the</strong> civilian
population to <strong>the</strong> extent that it would turn its support against Hezbollah <strong>and</strong> create a
“local political reaction to Hezbollah’s adventurism.” 363 According to this vision, air power
could achieve those strategic objectives while exposing <strong>the</strong> IDF to a much lower risk of
casualties than <strong>the</strong>y if <strong>the</strong>y were to strive to win with a ground attack, since “<strong>the</strong>re is no
ground battle without casualties.” 364
Operational imperatives <strong>and</strong> preferences for low casualties, however, operated in different
directions. Achieving <strong>the</strong> two strategic objectives “stop(ping) <strong>the</strong> firing of Katyusha rockets
against Israeli communities <strong>and</strong> return(ing) <strong>the</strong> two abducted soldiers to Israel” 365 likely
called for an approach that integrated more ground forces with <strong>the</strong> use of air power, an
argument <strong>the</strong> chapter turns to with greater detail in <strong>the</strong> next section.
Instead, however, <strong>the</strong> military <strong>and</strong> civilian leadership opted for <strong>the</strong> lower cost strategy
of air power. In one incisive after-action analysis, a prominent Israeli columnist sought
to identify <strong>the</strong> cause of <strong>the</strong> IDF’s challenges: “Usually, <strong>the</strong> accusation of folly is directed
at battle-hungry generals <strong>and</strong> warmongering politicians. However, at <strong>the</strong> end of this
war, <strong>the</strong> accusation of folly will be directed at an entire cadre of Israeli opinion-makers
<strong>and</strong> social leaders who lived in a bubble <strong>and</strong> caused Israel to live in a bubble.” 366 That
bubble, Ari Shavit writes, is set off from a reality in which Israel’s survival should
have been predicated on its willingness to defend its interests through all necessary
means; by fighting through means thought to limit casualties, that is, through an
emphasis on st<strong>and</strong>-off air power, <strong>the</strong>y constrained <strong>the</strong> options <strong>and</strong> compromised
<strong>the</strong>ir ability to defend <strong>the</strong>mselves. Shavit concludes that for <strong>the</strong> Israeli leadership, “its
caution is a recipe for disaster. Its attempt to prevent bloodshed is costing a great deal
of bloodshed.” 367
The words sound dramatically similar to those of Clausewitz, who offered sage advice on
<strong>the</strong> potential consequences of strategic restraint:
Kind-hearted people might of course think <strong>the</strong>re was some ingenious
way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed,
<strong>and</strong> might imagine this <strong>the</strong> true goal of <strong>the</strong> art of war. Pleasant as it
sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous
business that <strong>the</strong> mistakes which come from kindness are <strong>the</strong> very
worst … It would be futile – even wrong – to try <strong>and</strong> shut one’s eyes
to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality. 368
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”