Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 11
of adages: take <strong>the</strong> high ground; “get <strong>the</strong>re fustest with <strong>the</strong> mostest” (<strong>the</strong> alleged words of
General Nathan Bedford Forrest); <strong>and</strong>, for <strong>the</strong> pilot: check six or “nothing is more useless
than runway behind you <strong>and</strong> altitude above you.” For those more learned we have <strong>the</strong>
words of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery who supposedly commented that <strong>the</strong> first
rule of war is that you cannot walk to Moscow. And <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> apposite observation
made by Field Marshal William Slim: “While <strong>the</strong> battles <strong>the</strong> British fight may differ in <strong>the</strong>
widest possible ways, <strong>the</strong>y have invariably two common characteristics – <strong>the</strong>y are always
fought uphill <strong>and</strong> always at <strong>the</strong> junction of two or more map sheets.” 455
O<strong>the</strong>rs have taken this subject a bit more seriously. Over two millennia ago Sun Tzu
wrote what some today regard as a classic work of war strategy. I say “some” regard it
as a classic. One of my brighter students referred to The Art of War derisively as “war by
fortune cookie”. He had a point. None<strong>the</strong>less, Master Sun was <strong>the</strong> first to compile a group
of statements that he termed “considerations.” These were, truthfully, fairly simplistic,
including questions such as “which of <strong>the</strong> two generals has most ability” <strong>and</strong> “which army
is <strong>the</strong> stronger” <strong>and</strong> “most highly trained?” 456 Not very impressive.
Many generals, <strong>and</strong> perhaps o<strong>the</strong>rs wishing <strong>the</strong>y could be, continued to expound on
rules regarding warfare: Niccolo Machiavelli, Henry Lloyd, Maurice de Saxe, Carl von
Clausewitz <strong>and</strong> Antoine-Henri Jomini. 457 These last two, participants <strong>and</strong> observers of
Napoleonic warfare, have had <strong>the</strong> greatest influence on modern military thought.
Clausewitz has had, regrettably, a greater impact on military <strong>and</strong> political leaders in
<strong>the</strong> west than anyone in history. To give him his due: <strong>the</strong>re are several concepts that
Clausewitz is justifiably famous for articulating. He warned all political <strong>and</strong> military
leaders to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> kind of war upon which <strong>the</strong>y were embarking. He stressed <strong>the</strong>
importance of knowing in advance precisely what <strong>the</strong>y wanted to achieve <strong>and</strong> how much
<strong>the</strong>y were willing to pay in blood <strong>and</strong> treasure to obtain it. At <strong>the</strong> same time, however,
attempting to plan out exactly how a war or campaign would unfold was ludicrous.
Nothing ever worked as intended due to fog, friction <strong>and</strong> chance.
These were not new ideas. Yet Clausewitz was seminal because he was <strong>the</strong> first to examine
<strong>the</strong>m rigorously <strong>and</strong> at length. There is a special value in being able to take ideas that have
been circulating in <strong>the</strong> e<strong>the</strong>r, analyse <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n explain <strong>the</strong>m to o<strong>the</strong>rs. Clausewitz
did that, <strong>and</strong> he did so quite well.
I did say, however, that Clausewitz’s enormous influence has been regrettable. I contend
that is so because his most enduring, <strong>and</strong> pernicious, influence has been his insistence
on <strong>the</strong> need for a bloody <strong>and</strong> decisive battle. His statements on <strong>the</strong> necessity for such
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 187