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Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

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Chapter 13<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> use of lethal force. If we have overwhelming trust in technology we will lose <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> ability<br />

to recognise <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> different delicate aspects of warfare which require human judgement.<br />

An example of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> technical limitati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> of target informati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> use of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

precisi<strong>on</strong>-guided muniti<strong>on</strong>s was when during Operati<strong>on</strong> Allied Force NATO aircraft<br />

bombed a railway bridge while a train was crossing. 549 A UAV was operating in <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> vicinity<br />

of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> railway bridge transmitting a real time picture to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> CAOC 550 in Viezenca. The<br />

picture from <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> UAV showed an “empty” railway bridge with no o<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>rs elements around.<br />

Clearance was given to release weap<strong>on</strong>s from <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> CAOC. Yet due to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> limited ability to<br />

change <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> angle of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> camera <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> UAV, <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> incoming train was not detected until<br />

sec<strong>on</strong>ds before weap<strong>on</strong> impact. 551 The result was <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> death of n<strong>on</strong>-combatants causing<br />

uproar am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> media <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>cern am<strong>on</strong>gst NATO comm<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>ers. 552 The combinati<strong>on</strong><br />

of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> limited visual angle from <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> UAV <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> a wr<strong>on</strong>g assumpti<strong>on</strong> from <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> pilot dropping<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> bomb, c<strong>on</strong>tributed to making this disastrous judgement. 553<br />

Even if <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> aim of<br />

technology is to give us advantages we have also to c<strong>on</strong>sider <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> limitati<strong>on</strong>s of technology<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> not trust it blindly. This is especially relevant for people in <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g> Force. The <str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Force is probably <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> most technology-dependent of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> armed services. The complex<br />

technical systems up<strong>on</strong> which air forces depend can break down or errors can occur. It<br />

is a short distance from a precisi<strong>on</strong>-bomb to an ordinary dumb bomb. We are ethically<br />

irresp<strong>on</strong>sible if we blindly trust technology without taking into account its limitati<strong>on</strong>s, or<br />

if we blindly trust technology’s ability to give us crystal clear informati<strong>on</strong>. As air power<br />

becomes more <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> more dependent <strong>on</strong> technology – for instance <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> increased use of<br />

UCAV – we have an ethical obligati<strong>on</strong> to know <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> limitati<strong>on</strong>s of technology. Also, as<br />

far as possible we should be able to underst<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> what influence technology has <strong>on</strong> our<br />

percepti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>duct of war.<br />

The technical ability to discriminate between military <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> n<strong>on</strong>-military targets has never<br />

been better than it is today. Still, as pointed out above, harm to civilian pers<strong>on</strong>nel <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

damage to infrastructure due to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> use of air power do occur. There are several ethical<br />

challenges c<strong>on</strong>cerning targeting. One of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> ethical challenges, due to <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> fluid battlefield,<br />

is <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> ability to discriminate between combatants <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> n<strong>on</strong>-combatants, because<br />

combatants are often indistinguishable from n<strong>on</strong>-combatants. Combatants have driven<br />

western air power to attack moving targets <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> targets of opportunity, which present a<br />

higher chance of errors <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> collateral damage. The proporti<strong>on</strong>ate use of force is ano<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r<br />

ethical aspect highlighted by <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> envir<strong>on</strong>ment in which <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> new wars are fought. The<br />

weap<strong>on</strong>s of air power are ill-suited for some of <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> missi<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>ducted, <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>refore causing<br />

greater damage than o<str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g>r means could have d<strong>on</strong>e. Verified <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> correct intelligence<br />

is <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> basis for targeting. Even still, this area is subject to misuse, leading to ethically<br />

wr<strong>on</strong>gful decisi<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>cerning <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> use of force. The technology involved in <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> use of air<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>Air</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Power</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Insurgency</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>the</str<strong>on</strong>g> “War <strong>on</strong> Terror” 231

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