Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

The RAF in Counter-<strong>Insurgency</strong> Warfare: British Intervention in Greece, 1944-45
assistance up to this point, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Force Liaison Officers were increasingly at <strong>the</strong> forefront
of discussions over <strong>the</strong> “art of <strong>the</strong> possible,” given <strong>the</strong> air support on offer. In fact, <strong>the</strong> best
work on effect was performed by <strong>the</strong> RAF from <strong>the</strong> third week of December onwards. Not
only were <strong>the</strong> subtleties of <strong>the</strong> effect of attacks analysed, but <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r effects of persistent
air power over <strong>the</strong> city were also investigated. 216
This work was done against a backdrop of overriding concern for <strong>the</strong> safety of Greek
civilians <strong>and</strong> fears over “ blue on blue”. Until mid-December, <strong>the</strong> conflict was largely
guerrilla in nature, with h<strong>and</strong>-to-h<strong>and</strong> fighting being <strong>the</strong> norm, very often within close
proximity to Greek civilians, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fluidity of <strong>the</strong> battlespace precluded most close air
support. However, from this point, ELAS forces coalesced in reasonably well defined
areas of <strong>the</strong> city, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> firepower advantages of air power could be brought to bear.
Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> boundary between ELAS fighters <strong>and</strong> innocent civilians was typically
measured in terms of <strong>the</strong> boundary between one house <strong>and</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong>
RAF crews had extremely rigorous Rules of Engagement. They were not permitted to
attack buildings unless <strong>the</strong>re was absolute certainty that <strong>the</strong>y contained insurgents, <strong>and</strong>
targets had to be verified by friendly troops on <strong>the</strong> ground. Physical damage was to be kept
to a bare minimum. So High Explosive ordnance, especially bombs, was used sparingly.
If bombs had to be used, approval had first to be sought from General Scobie, who was
extremely sensitive to Communist accusations of indiscriminate aerial attack. In most
cases, 25lb armour piercing rockets <strong>and</strong> cannon were used in preference to bombs or high
explosive 60lb Rockets (which also proved more difficult to aim). <strong>Air</strong>crews also found that
in areas which required attention to detail, cannon <strong>and</strong> machine gun fire were preferable
to rockets or bombs. <strong>Air</strong>crews increasingly showed a preference for getting in “close <strong>and</strong>
personal,” using visual confirmation of targets, in order to ensure hits. It is important
to emphasise here that this was by no means a low-threat operating environment. The
insurgents made good use of former German <strong>and</strong> Italian AAA, which <strong>the</strong>y positioned on
<strong>the</strong> tops of buildings, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y also used snipers. In response, Spitfires <strong>and</strong> Beaufighters
adopted oblique attack angles <strong>and</strong> flew at rooftop height. Although no aircraft were lost
to AAA or sniper fire, direct hits were scored on aircraft <strong>and</strong> AAA fire was often reported
to be very accurate. 217
The period from 17 December 1944 to 1 January 1945 saw a major offensive by British
forces to clear ELAS from <strong>the</strong> centre of A<strong>the</strong>ns <strong>and</strong> secure <strong>the</strong> port at Piraeus. The offensive
was characterised by human intelligence-led 218 close air support, <strong>the</strong> third new major
role for <strong>the</strong> RAF. Local knowledge was used to pin-point insurgent positions. This was
crucial because, just like any classic insurgency, many ELAS adopted <strong>the</strong> ruse of wearing
civilian clothing. This was particularly <strong>the</strong> case with those insurgents recruited locally in
A<strong>the</strong>ns, who formed part of <strong>the</strong> Auxiliary ELAS. Meanwhile, o<strong>the</strong>r ELAS wore battledress
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”