Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

“Looks Suspicious”: The US Marines <strong>Air</strong> Campaign against <strong>the</strong> S<strong>and</strong>ino Insurgents of Nicaragua 1927-1933
<strong>the</strong> Guardia be disb<strong>and</strong>ed. The new Nicaraguan comm<strong>and</strong>er of <strong>the</strong> Guardia, Anastasio
Somoza García, decided to act. In 1934, after ano<strong>the</strong>r negotiating session <strong>and</strong> dinner with
<strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan president, Guardia soldiers abducted <strong>and</strong> executed S<strong>and</strong>ino. Somoza
<strong>the</strong>n seized power <strong>and</strong> his family ruled Nicaraguan for 45 years. Yet S<strong>and</strong>ino’s vision was
ultimately achieved. The Somoza dynasty was finally overthrown in 1979 in a popular
insurrection led by <strong>the</strong> Frente S<strong>and</strong>inista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN: S<strong>and</strong>inista
Front for National Liberation), a modern guerrilla organization inspired by <strong>and</strong> named
after S<strong>and</strong>ino.
What lessons can be learned from <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan experience? This campaign demonstrates
that winning support from <strong>the</strong> local population is key to victory. However, <strong>the</strong> tactics used
by <strong>the</strong> Marines in <strong>the</strong>ir attempt to achieve a military victory contributed to a political
defeat. Their very presence in <strong>the</strong> Segovias caused growing support for S<strong>and</strong>ino. Major R
Scott Moore, USMC, in his study of <strong>the</strong> war, emphasised that: “American intrusion into
<strong>the</strong> internal politics of ano<strong>the</strong>r state eventually alienated <strong>the</strong> people it was intended to
help. … trying to impose American social <strong>and</strong> political st<strong>and</strong>ards on top of a developing
country’s own political <strong>and</strong> cultural institutions merely aggravated nationalism”. 200
<strong>Air</strong> power has become an important component of any modern counter-insurgency. Yet,
if winning “hearts <strong>and</strong> minds” is essential, <strong>the</strong>n attacking civilians from <strong>the</strong> air is clearly
problematic. As James Corum <strong>and</strong> Wray Johnson note in <strong>Air</strong>power in Small Wars, doing
so is “ineffective <strong>and</strong> counterproductive”. 201 However, despite all <strong>the</strong> orders, reports <strong>and</strong>
manuals calling for “restraint,” identifying <strong>and</strong> accurately targeting enemy combatants
continue to be very difficult, despite <strong>the</strong> best attempts of modern aviators.
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”